Farrell, Thomas B. “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical

Farrell, Thomas B. “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory” The Quarterly Journal of Speech. 62.1 (1975).

“In Aristotle’s early expansive vision, then, rhetoric was the art which employed the common knowledge of a particular audience to inform and guide reasoned judgments about matters of public interest” (1). -B

“Aristotle was able to posit a body of common knowledge as a natural corollary to his idealizations of human nature, the potential of human reason, and the norms and procedures of public decision making” (2). =B

“With each alteration in our conception of knowledge, then, the art of rhetoric—which seems to depend upon a kind of collective knowledge—altered its status and function accordingly” (2-3). =A

As we change, so does rhetoric. It bases itself around what is, for the time, considered reality. Now, reality is that women are not less than men nor do they have a special code of conduct.

“It is neither possible nor practical to exhaustively refute all conceptions of knowledge which once impeded the current inquiry; fortunately, it is also unnecessary. The contradictions of extreme realism, radical empiricism, and logical positivism are now clearly apparent to all but their most steadfast adherents. Contemporary philosophy has now moved away from the detached derivation of criteria for knowledge and toward more inclusive study of human activity in all its forms—even as this activity informs the process of scientific knowing itself (3).
=B & E

“Thomas Kuhn terms consensual agreements on a structured universe of discourse, ‘paradigms,’ and suggests that without such a consensual context, even the developed sciences would lose their rigor and analycity” (3). =B

“No criterion for knowledge can be polemically proclaimed; at the very least, it must require the cooperation of others in some form” (3). =B

Knowledge is created through an exchange of ideas, but is not handed down singularly. It must work in concert with other knowledge bases in order to create a genuinely knowledgable experience.

“The analytic rigor and synthetic precision of any body of knowledge, then, would seem to vary in direct relation to two interdependent factors:
(1) the degree of actual consensus on methods of investigation, procedures of analysis and operation of measurement.
(2) the knowers’ degree of detachment from human interests related to the object of knowledge” (4). =B & A

“I call this knowledge ‘social knowledge’ and define it as follows:
Social knowledge comprises conceptions of symbolic relationships among problems, persons, interests, and actions, which imply (when accepted) certain notions of preferable public behavior” (4). =B

“Social knowledge is a kind of general and symbolic relationship which acquires its rhetorical function when it is assumed to be shared by knowers in their unique capacity as audience. Whereas technical or specialized knowledge is actualized through its perceived correspondence to the external world, social knowledge is actualized through the decision and action of an audience (4). =B

“And rhetoric (barring the use of force) is the primary process by which social conduct is corrdinated” (5). =B & E

This is how conduct books work. They begin by pulling on social knowledge, and then using rhetoric to imply the importance of that knowledge and those rules.

‘social knowledge depends upon an ‘acquaintance with’ (to use James’ phrase) or a personal relationship to other actors in the social world” (5). =B & A

Thus if we all “know” something socially, it is because we know others who agree with that “knowing”. Burke’s theory of identity.

“the attribution of consensus is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for social knowledge to be rhetorically impactful” (78). =B

“By definition, then, the knowledge which is distinctly rhetorical in function—that is, social knowledge—must be based upon a consensus which is attributed rather than fully realized” (8). =B

“social knowledge becomes the emergent property of a collectivity. It is an attribution which is general in scope rather than abstract in epistemic status”(9). =B

“Rather than being fixed, permanent and static, therefore, social knowledge is transitional and generative” (9). =B & E

The collective owns the knowledge, like community, which is why the folklore in “Space on the side of the Road” works so well. It is all knowledge based on a community knowing, which then makes the rhetoric more effective.

“the most elusive and important characteristic of social knowledge. I refer to its affective or normative impact on decision-making” (10). =B

“More problematic is the tendency of mass media to publicize, even create social knowledge which forces options without suggesting actional outlets for mass concern” (11). =B

“The overarching function of social knowledge is to transform the society into a community” (11). =B & A

FOLKLORE!

“social knowledge helps define a ‘zone of relevance’ in matters of human choice’ (12). =B

“social knowledge is a way of imparting significance to the numerous ‘bits’ of information which are disseminated to the mass of public citizens” (12). =B

‘social knowledge allows each social actor to confront a set of generalized assumptions suggesting the relative priority of collective commitments held by others” (12). =B