Cicero, On the Ideal Orator Trans. May, James M. and Wisse, Jakob. Oxford, UP: New York (2001).
“Yet again, if you look at this group, where excellence is so very rare, and are willing to make a careful selection both from our number and from that of the Greeks, you will find that there have been far fewer good orators than good poets” (60).
“To begin with, one must acquire knowledge of a great number of things, for without this a ready flow of words is empty and ridiculous; the language itself has to be shaped not only by the choice of words but by their arrangement as well; also required is a thorough acquaintance with all the emotions with which nature has endowed the human race, because in soothing or in exciting the feelings of the audience the full force of oratory and all its available means must be brought into play” (61).
In this work I particularly admired Plato for the way in which, while making fun of orators, he appeared to be a supreme orator himself” (69).
I find this particularly interesting as I was thinking the same as I watched
Socrates argue in circles, but argue with eminent superiority.
“For everyone knows that the power of an orator is most manifest in dealing with people’s feelings, when he is stirring them to anger or to hatred and resentment, or is calling them back from these same emotions to mildness and compassion” (70).
“Well, then,” said Crassus, “in my opinion it is, in the first place natural ability and talent that make a very important contribution to oratory” (83).
“First, so the rules say, the duty of the orator is to speak in a manner suited to persuasion. Next, every speech is concerned either with the investigation of an indefinite, general matter, in which the persons or occasions are unspecified, or with a matter that is tied to specific persons or occasions. Furthermore, in both cases, whatever the point at issue may be, the question always posed is either whether or not the deed was done, or , if it was, what its nature is, or again by what name it should be called, or as some add whether or not it seems to have been done justly. Furthermore, issues also arise from the inpretation of written documents, if some part of the test gives rise to ambiguity with intent” (89).
Invention: Arguments
Arguments are derived from connecdted terms, from a genus, from a simkilarity, and from attendant circumstances, from consistencies and from antecedents and from contradictions. (167).
Invention: ethos and pathos
“For nothing in oratory, Catulus, is more important that for the orator to be favorably regarded by the audience, and for the audience itself to be moved in such a way as to be ruled by some strong emotional impulse rather than by a reasoned judgment” (170).
“Now, the following emotions are the most important for us to arouse with our speech in the hearts of the jurors, or of any other audience we addresss: affection, hate, anger, envy, pity, hope, joy, fear, and grief” (178).
Again, no mention of guilt at all.
“It is also pleasant and often tremendously useful to employ human and witticisms” ((180).
“Prompted by this experience, he is then said to have made the discovery that order is what brings light to our memory” (219).
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Monday, February 22, 2010
Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. Jowett, Benjamin
Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. Jowett, Benjamin
Every one sees that love is a desire, and we know also that non-lovers desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other conquers.
And so he runs away and is constrained to be a defaulter; the oyster-shell has fallen with the other side uppermost-he changes pursuit into flight, while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation not knowing that he ought never from the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was giving himself up to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his estate, hurtful to his bodily health, and still more hurtful to the cultivation of his mind, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything more honoured in the eyes both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed upon you:
But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art-he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with the madman.
Phaedr. I thought, Socrates, that he was. And you are aware that the greatest and most influential statesmen are ashamed of writing speeches and leaving them in a written form, lest they should be called Sophists by posterity.
Phaedr. And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good or honourable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth.
And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse puts good for evil being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes is ignorant; and having studied the notions of the multitude, falsely persuades them not about "the shadow of an ass," which he confounds with a horse, but about good which he confounds with evily-what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that seed?
Phaedr. The reverse of good.
Soc. The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is the art, if there be such an art, which is able to find a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others? **
Soc. In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?
Phaedr. Clearly, in the uncertain class.
Soc. Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err?
Phaedr. He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle.
Soc. Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred.
Phaedr. Certainly.
Soc. Now to which class does love belong-to the debatable or to the undisputed class?
Phaedr. To the debatable, clearly; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good? **
Soc. First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear.
The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name-after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name, but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits.
es; thank you for reminding me:-There is the exordium, showing how the speech should begin, if I remember rightly; that is what you mean-the niceties of the art?
Phaedr. Yes.
Soc. Then follows the statement of facts, and upon that witnesses; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities are to come; the great Byzantian word-maker also speaks, if I am not mistaken, of confirmation and further confirmation.
Yes; and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defence. I ought also to mention the illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first invented insinuations and indirect praises; and also indirect censures, which according to some he put into verse to help the memory. But shall I "to dumb forgetfulness consign" Tisias and Gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth, and who by: force of argument make the little appear great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything, either short or going on to infinity. I remember Prodicus laughing when I told him of this; he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length.
The perfection which is required of the finished orator is, or rather must be, like the perfection of anything else; partly given by nature, but may also be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add to it knowledge and practice, you will be a distinguished speaker; if you fall short in either of these, you will be to that extent defective. But the art, as far as there is an art, of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Lysias or Thrasymachus.
Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls-they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes:-"Such and such persons," he will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way," and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, "This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion"; -he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned;-when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says "I don't believe you" has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?
Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul, and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the more complex nature-until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading;-such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument.
Every one sees that love is a desire, and we know also that non-lovers desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other conquers.
And so he runs away and is constrained to be a defaulter; the oyster-shell has fallen with the other side uppermost-he changes pursuit into flight, while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation not knowing that he ought never from the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was giving himself up to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his estate, hurtful to his bodily health, and still more hurtful to the cultivation of his mind, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything more honoured in the eyes both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed upon you:
But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art-he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with the madman.
Phaedr. I thought, Socrates, that he was. And you are aware that the greatest and most influential statesmen are ashamed of writing speeches and leaving them in a written form, lest they should be called Sophists by posterity.
Phaedr. And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good or honourable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth.
And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse puts good for evil being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes is ignorant; and having studied the notions of the multitude, falsely persuades them not about "the shadow of an ass," which he confounds with a horse, but about good which he confounds with evily-what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that seed?
Phaedr. The reverse of good.
Soc. The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is the art, if there be such an art, which is able to find a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others? **
Soc. In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?
Phaedr. Clearly, in the uncertain class.
Soc. Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err?
Phaedr. He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle.
Soc. Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred.
Phaedr. Certainly.
Soc. Now to which class does love belong-to the debatable or to the undisputed class?
Phaedr. To the debatable, clearly; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good? **
Soc. First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea; as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse, the speaker should define his several notions and so make his meaning clear.
The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. Just as our two discourses, alike assumed, first of all, a single form of unreason; and then, as the body which from being one becomes double and may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left of the same name-after this manner the speaker proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until he found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled; and the other discourse leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, also having the same name, but divine, which the speaker held up before us and applauded and affirmed to be the author of the greatest benefits.
es; thank you for reminding me:-There is the exordium, showing how the speech should begin, if I remember rightly; that is what you mean-the niceties of the art?
Phaedr. Yes.
Soc. Then follows the statement of facts, and upon that witnesses; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities are to come; the great Byzantian word-maker also speaks, if I am not mistaken, of confirmation and further confirmation.
Yes; and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defence. I ought also to mention the illustrious Parian, Evenus, who first invented insinuations and indirect praises; and also indirect censures, which according to some he put into verse to help the memory. But shall I "to dumb forgetfulness consign" Tisias and Gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth, and who by: force of argument make the little appear great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything, either short or going on to infinity. I remember Prodicus laughing when I told him of this; he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length.
The perfection which is required of the finished orator is, or rather must be, like the perfection of anything else; partly given by nature, but may also be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add to it knowledge and practice, you will be a distinguished speaker; if you fall short in either of these, you will be to that extent defective. But the art, as far as there is an art, of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Lysias or Thrasymachus.
Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls-they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes:-"Such and such persons," he will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way," and he will tell you why. The pupil must have a good theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, "This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion"; -he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned;-when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and yet declares that he speaks by rules of art, he who says "I don't believe you" has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, and Socrates, your account of the so-called art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?
Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul, and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the more complex nature-until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading;-such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument.
Plato. “Gorgias”
Plato. “Gorgias” Trans. Benjamin Jowett. The Internet Classics Archives. Web. 2
November 2009. < http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/gorgias.html>.
“Socrates: And now let us have from you, Gorgias the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words” (6). =B
“GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is trutl7y the greatest being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in their several states” (7). =B
“GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting.—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude” (7). =B
“SOCRATES: . . .rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?” =B
“GORGIAS: . . .rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust” (9). =B
“GORGIAS: . . .in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject” (11). =B
“SOCRATES; And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discoversome way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?” (13). =B
Cookery and rhetoric are part of the same profession. (17).
“SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word ‘flatery’, and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:--another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches,(18). =B
“SOCRATES. . .that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power” (26). =B
“SOCRATES: but in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doing of the unjust actions is miserable in any case—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men” (28). =B
“SOCRATES: Tell me then:--you say, do you not, that in the rightly developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that is virtue?” (49). =B
“SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, “ (63). =B
Reminds me of Augustine’s ability to see that rhetoric can be used for both evil and good.
“SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all hi actions both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice?” (65). =B
“SOCRATES: I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict” (82). =B
“Let us, then, take the argument as our guide which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practice justice and every virtue in life and death” (83). =B
November 2009. < http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/gorgias.html>.
“Socrates: And now let us have from you, Gorgias the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words” (6). =B
“GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is trutl7y the greatest being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in their several states” (7). =B
“GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting.—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude” (7). =B
“SOCRATES: . . .rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?” =B
“GORGIAS: . . .rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust” (9). =B
“GORGIAS: . . .in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject” (11). =B
“SOCRATES; And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discoversome way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?” (13). =B
Cookery and rhetoric are part of the same profession. (17).
“SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word ‘flatery’, and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:--another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches,(18). =B
“SOCRATES. . .that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power” (26). =B
“SOCRATES: but in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doing of the unjust actions is miserable in any case—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men” (28). =B
“SOCRATES: Tell me then:--you say, do you not, that in the rightly developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that is virtue?” (49). =B
“SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, “ (63). =B
Reminds me of Augustine’s ability to see that rhetoric can be used for both evil and good.
“SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all hi actions both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice?” (65). =B
“SOCRATES: I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict” (82). =B
“Let us, then, take the argument as our guide which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practice justice and every virtue in life and death” (83). =B
Saturday, February 20, 2010
Gillman, Alice. “Collaboration, Ethics, and the Emotional A Way to Move
Gillman, Alice. “Collaboration, Ethics, and the Emotional labor of WPA’s” A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH.
“masculine agency described by Ed White in ‘Use It or Lose It: Power and the WPA’ (1991); aggressive and decisive action, tough talk, and strategic, preemptive moves” (116).
“In her groundbreaking study The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (1983), Hochschild defines emotional labor as requiring ‘one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” (117).
Boy, howdy, isn’t that the truth!
“While most jobs require some management of feeling, Hochschild contends that if we are too successful in censoring private feelings and publicly performing contrary ones, we risk ‘losing the signal function of feeling’ (21). Drawing on Freaud’s notion that feelings perform a ‘signal’ or epistemic function in revealing inner perspectives and external realities” (118).
“First, I think that all writing program administration involves ministration or service in the name of other agencies and agendas and we ignore this or are blind to it it to our own detriment. Second, I think that over identification with an idea, principle, policy or programmatic model can lead to the kind of epistemic and ethical “lean” Barrky discusses even if the idea or principle is far more enlightened than the notion of certifiable proficiency for all. In other words, caretaking of even noble principles can be blinding and can work against self-critique.
Further, I think that women administrators may be more vulnerable to overidentification. (119).
“Despite the invaluable contribution of the WPA position statement on’Evaluating the Intellectual Work of Writing Administration’ in validating WPA work, it reifies the distinction between intellectual and emotional labor and ignores the less visible and commodifiable aspects of our work” (123).
“masculine agency described by Ed White in ‘Use It or Lose It: Power and the WPA’ (1991); aggressive and decisive action, tough talk, and strategic, preemptive moves” (116).
“In her groundbreaking study The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (1983), Hochschild defines emotional labor as requiring ‘one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” (117).
Boy, howdy, isn’t that the truth!
“While most jobs require some management of feeling, Hochschild contends that if we are too successful in censoring private feelings and publicly performing contrary ones, we risk ‘losing the signal function of feeling’ (21). Drawing on Freaud’s notion that feelings perform a ‘signal’ or epistemic function in revealing inner perspectives and external realities” (118).
“First, I think that all writing program administration involves ministration or service in the name of other agencies and agendas and we ignore this or are blind to it it to our own detriment. Second, I think that over identification with an idea, principle, policy or programmatic model can lead to the kind of epistemic and ethical “lean” Barrky discusses even if the idea or principle is far more enlightened than the notion of certifiable proficiency for all. In other words, caretaking of even noble principles can be blinding and can work against self-critique.
Further, I think that women administrators may be more vulnerable to overidentification. (119).
“Despite the invaluable contribution of the WPA position statement on’Evaluating the Intellectual Work of Writing Administration’ in validating WPA work, it reifies the distinction between intellectual and emotional labor and ignores the less visible and commodifiable aspects of our work” (123).
Murray, Piper. “Containing Creatures A Way to Move
Murray, Piper. “Containing Creatures We Barely Imagine: Responding to ‘Bad’ Students’ Writing. A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH
“what is our relationship to our theories about student writing that they should find us—those who find ourselves both ‘out there in the teaching world’ and at the same time very much ‘in here’ in Composition—much more easily embarrassed by the ‘truths’ than some surly senior professor, who clearly knows nothing of such matters?”
“No matter how much pleasure we may take in its telling, few of us entertain any illusions that the writing process movement really brought the revolution in the teaching of writing that we like to think it did” (95).
There’s been not genuine revolution, only a gathering of ideas and information in order to re-evaluate how we teach in order to use old ideas in combination with new to teach in a better way.
“Here we find that the responses associated with each form do indeed break down into fairly oppositional—and fairly telling—terms: frustration and blame belonging to one grand category, interest and analysis to another” (96).
“Thus, at the same time as Miller exposes as fantasy the idea ‘that two ‘grand theories’ have sequentially controlled the teaching of writing’ (70),it would seem that she ultimately preserves that fantasy—if only as an ideal-- when it comes to how we respond to ‘bad’ student writing (96).
“Writing theory may have done away with the idea or ‘theory’ that students ought to be faulted for writing ‘badly’. But as our ongoing frustration and blame continue to assert—in spite of all our wishful thinking that it were otherwise—writing theory cannot do away with the feeling that at least some ‘bad’ student writing is, after all, the product of ‘bad’ students(97).
Now, and only now, does this sense that we must “throw away” older theories make sense to me. We are not disregarding the theories, whether we know it or not, we are fighting against the urge to “blame” students when writing is poorly executed!
“In other words, reread as a structure of feeling, the dissonance we feel between interest and analysis on the one hand, and frustration and blame on the other, might be taken, not as a sign that our theory and practice are often at odds with one another (which is news to no one), but instead as a sign that there are aspects of our experience that remain in tension with both our theory and practice” (100).
“what is our relationship to our theories about student writing that they should find us—those who find ourselves both ‘out there in the teaching world’ and at the same time very much ‘in here’ in Composition—much more easily embarrassed by the ‘truths’ than some surly senior professor, who clearly knows nothing of such matters?”
“No matter how much pleasure we may take in its telling, few of us entertain any illusions that the writing process movement really brought the revolution in the teaching of writing that we like to think it did” (95).
There’s been not genuine revolution, only a gathering of ideas and information in order to re-evaluate how we teach in order to use old ideas in combination with new to teach in a better way.
“Here we find that the responses associated with each form do indeed break down into fairly oppositional—and fairly telling—terms: frustration and blame belonging to one grand category, interest and analysis to another” (96).
“Thus, at the same time as Miller exposes as fantasy the idea ‘that two ‘grand theories’ have sequentially controlled the teaching of writing’ (70),it would seem that she ultimately preserves that fantasy—if only as an ideal-- when it comes to how we respond to ‘bad’ student writing (96).
“Writing theory may have done away with the idea or ‘theory’ that students ought to be faulted for writing ‘badly’. But as our ongoing frustration and blame continue to assert—in spite of all our wishful thinking that it were otherwise—writing theory cannot do away with the feeling that at least some ‘bad’ student writing is, after all, the product of ‘bad’ students(97).
Now, and only now, does this sense that we must “throw away” older theories make sense to me. We are not disregarding the theories, whether we know it or not, we are fighting against the urge to “blame” students when writing is poorly executed!
“In other words, reread as a structure of feeling, the dissonance we feel between interest and analysis on the one hand, and frustration and blame on the other, might be taken, not as a sign that our theory and practice are often at odds with one another (which is news to no one), but instead as a sign that there are aspects of our experience that remain in tension with both our theory and practice” (100).
Ryden, Wendy. “Conflict and Kitsch:A Way to Move:
Ryden, Wendy. “Conflict and Kitsch: The Politics of Politeness in the Writing Class” A Way to Move:
Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH
“This manufacturing of consent is what theorists of political kitsch ulti9mately see as the consequence of an idyllic culture aesthetic that favors harmony over rupture” (83).
“A slippery term, I take ‘crisis’ to mean not so much that crisis should be induced, but rather responded to” (91).
Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH
“This manufacturing of consent is what theorists of political kitsch ulti9mately see as the consequence of an idyllic culture aesthetic that favors harmony over rupture” (83).
“A slippery term, I take ‘crisis’ to mean not so much that crisis should be induced, but rather responded to” (91).
Strickland, Donna and Crawford, Ilene. “Error and Racialized A Way to Move
Strickland, Donna and Crawford, Ilene. “Error and Racialized Performances of Emotion in the Teaching Of Wrirting.” A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH.
“The ‘habitus,’ for Bourdieu, ‘is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The disposition generates practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule’ (68).
“Further, the primary work of this dominant pedagogical violence ‘is to organize an emotional world, to inculcate patterns of feeling that support the dominant interests, patterns that are especially appropriate to gender, race, and class locations’ (1998, 223)” (68).
“Williams discovered that people claim to be equally sensitive to all errors when, in fact, there are a number of errors people miss most of the time. Most likely to be noticed and responded to immediately are errors that violate ‘the rules that define bedrock standard English’ (Williams 1981, 159).”
The thing of it is, I agree. We are in a place, the university, where we are attempting to teach a language. This language is standardized for more efficient performance on the part of both reader and writer.
“In addition to controlled behavior, controlled speech was another important way in which whites could distinguish themselves as morally different from Blacks” (71).
Why is it that people assume that language correction correlates with a feeling of superiority and morality? If I cannot understand you, we do not communicate. Race notwithstanding.
“The similarities between emotional and linguistic schooling are telling. Both are a set of skills that ‘normal’ children develop to succeed in life—in the schoolyard and later in the workplace” (72).
“These historical and contemporary examples demonstrate that the schooling of language and the schooling of emotion are never far apart” (72).
“Jane Hill demonstrates that ‘language panics are not really about language. Instead, they are about race. . .” (73).
I don’t care how people speak—outside the college classroom. Even inside the classroom when they are just talking. Language takes precedence when the conversation is meant to be academic in nature and not casual communication between friends or acquaintances. Can I not have it this way without being considered racist? Just out of curiosity, what would have happened if I’d have submitted my writing sample with the GRE in Ozarkian normal?
“Emotion is a powerful technology that connects language, morality, and order, producing a highly racialized sense of self” (79).
Farrydiddles. I’m the one that this article is pointing fingers at. I’m the person who expects papers to be turned in in an appropriate collegiate form of Englisih. I’m also the one who will correct how my students speak in the classroom. Why? Because I believe that if we are to promote an academic style of writing, and why else would we teach composition, then we should do so. I do not do this with malice, and I certainly do not “cut down” my students’ use of localized language. What I say to them is that “This is an English class. We want to learn how to write in a way that is efficient and effective across the board in an academic setting. It is not a matter of race, but a matter of language difference. What would have happened had I gone into a Spanish or German classroom and simply learned some of the language, but reserved the rest for my own interpretation? Adding English words where I felt it was more my own upbringing? I’d not have passed the course.
“The ‘habitus,’ for Bourdieu, ‘is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The disposition generates practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule’ (68).
“Further, the primary work of this dominant pedagogical violence ‘is to organize an emotional world, to inculcate patterns of feeling that support the dominant interests, patterns that are especially appropriate to gender, race, and class locations’ (1998, 223)” (68).
“Williams discovered that people claim to be equally sensitive to all errors when, in fact, there are a number of errors people miss most of the time. Most likely to be noticed and responded to immediately are errors that violate ‘the rules that define bedrock standard English’ (Williams 1981, 159).”
The thing of it is, I agree. We are in a place, the university, where we are attempting to teach a language. This language is standardized for more efficient performance on the part of both reader and writer.
“In addition to controlled behavior, controlled speech was another important way in which whites could distinguish themselves as morally different from Blacks” (71).
Why is it that people assume that language correction correlates with a feeling of superiority and morality? If I cannot understand you, we do not communicate. Race notwithstanding.
“The similarities between emotional and linguistic schooling are telling. Both are a set of skills that ‘normal’ children develop to succeed in life—in the schoolyard and later in the workplace” (72).
“These historical and contemporary examples demonstrate that the schooling of language and the schooling of emotion are never far apart” (72).
“Jane Hill demonstrates that ‘language panics are not really about language. Instead, they are about race. . .” (73).
I don’t care how people speak—outside the college classroom. Even inside the classroom when they are just talking. Language takes precedence when the conversation is meant to be academic in nature and not casual communication between friends or acquaintances. Can I not have it this way without being considered racist? Just out of curiosity, what would have happened if I’d have submitted my writing sample with the GRE in Ozarkian normal?
“Emotion is a powerful technology that connects language, morality, and order, producing a highly racialized sense of self” (79).
Farrydiddles. I’m the one that this article is pointing fingers at. I’m the person who expects papers to be turned in in an appropriate collegiate form of Englisih. I’m also the one who will correct how my students speak in the classroom. Why? Because I believe that if we are to promote an academic style of writing, and why else would we teach composition, then we should do so. I do not do this with malice, and I certainly do not “cut down” my students’ use of localized language. What I say to them is that “This is an English class. We want to learn how to write in a way that is efficient and effective across the board in an academic setting. It is not a matter of race, but a matter of language difference. What would have happened had I gone into a Spanish or German classroom and simply learned some of the language, but reserved the rest for my own interpretation? Adding English words where I felt it was more my own upbringing? I’d not have passed the course.
Friday, February 19, 2010
Kirtley, Susan. “What’s Love Got to Do with It?A Way to Move:
Kirtley, Susan. “What’s Love Got to Do with It? Eros in the Writing Classroom” .” A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH.
“It was thus early on that ‘heart knowledge’ was linked with ‘the body, emotions, women’ as well as the vernacular or common language, and therefore devalued, hidden, and concealed” (58).
“Writing feels to me like an attempt to make an association. The power of composition resides in thie ‘space between.’ Though the author may be long gone, once a link is fashioned with a reader, immortality is indeed achieved” (65).
“There is an intimate, alluring element in the composing process—isn’t writing an attempt to seduce readers, to entice them to see and feel the world as you wish them to? The writer issues an invitation and reaches out to the reader, much as the lover beckons to the beloved” (65). =A & E
My thoughts exactly.
“the joy of writing is not only in the product, but in the process as well, in the act of crafting language” (65). =A & E
“For me the erotic writing class is about an embodied, intellectual passion that bridges gaps as a daimon might (65). =B
“It was thus early on that ‘heart knowledge’ was linked with ‘the body, emotions, women’ as well as the vernacular or common language, and therefore devalued, hidden, and concealed” (58).
“Writing feels to me like an attempt to make an association. The power of composition resides in thie ‘space between.’ Though the author may be long gone, once a link is fashioned with a reader, immortality is indeed achieved” (65).
“There is an intimate, alluring element in the composing process—isn’t writing an attempt to seduce readers, to entice them to see and feel the world as you wish them to? The writer issues an invitation and reaches out to the reader, much as the lover beckons to the beloved” (65). =A & E
My thoughts exactly.
“the joy of writing is not only in the product, but in the process as well, in the act of crafting language” (65). =A & E
“For me the erotic writing class is about an embodied, intellectual passion that bridges gaps as a daimon might (65). =B
Cain, Mary Ann. “Moved by ‘Their’ Words A Way to Move
Cain, Mary Ann. “Moved by ‘Their’ Words: Emotion and the Participant Observer.” A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH.
“In short, we need narratives that will, on one hand, make readers aware of how certain discursive practices invite one to ‘overtake’ a text and, on the other hand, offer possibilities for resisting such ‘overtakings’ in our reading practices so that alternative viewpoints may be articulated’ (45). =A
“Similarly, in Composition scholarship, we either embrace emotions acritically (as in classroom narratives and professional memoirs) as ‘powerful’ or ignore them (as in conventional research since no ‘evidence’ exists to ‘prove an interpretation of a subject’s emotions” (54). =B
“Yet when scholarly practices preclude critical engagement with the emotional, they also deny the pedagogical aspects of all discursive exchanges including those between researchers and subjects” (54). =A
“However, by reframing the personal (and, in turn, the emotional) as always/already present within social formations of control and regulation, emotion as a ‘third factor’ in both scholarship and teaching in Composition Studies can serve to make the cultural forms it takes more visible” (54). =E
“In short, we need narratives that will, on one hand, make readers aware of how certain discursive practices invite one to ‘overtake’ a text and, on the other hand, offer possibilities for resisting such ‘overtakings’ in our reading practices so that alternative viewpoints may be articulated’ (45). =A
“Similarly, in Composition scholarship, we either embrace emotions acritically (as in classroom narratives and professional memoirs) as ‘powerful’ or ignore them (as in conventional research since no ‘evidence’ exists to ‘prove an interpretation of a subject’s emotions” (54). =B
“Yet when scholarly practices preclude critical engagement with the emotional, they also deny the pedagogical aspects of all discursive exchanges including those between researchers and subjects” (54). =A
“However, by reframing the personal (and, in turn, the emotional) as always/already present within social formations of control and regulation, emotion as a ‘third factor’ in both scholarship and teaching in Composition Studies can serve to make the cultural forms it takes more visible” (54). =E
Moon, Gretchen Flesher. “The Pathos of Pathos:A Way to Move
Moon, Gretchen Flesher. “The Pathos of Pathos: The treatment of Emotion in Contemporary Composition Textbooks.” A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH.
“When Aristotle delineates three appeals in the Rhetoric—logos, pathos, ethos—he establishes not only a system of classification, but a principle of valuation for study by the generations of rhetoricians to follow him” (33).
“Aristotle understands, accepts, and promotes emotional appeals and devotes a major portion of his treastie to them” (33). =A
“He claims at the outset that ‘the man who is to be in command of [the pisteis] must, it is clear, be able to reason logically, to understand human characters and excellences, and to understand the emotions—that , to know what they are, their nature, their causes and the way in which they are excited’” (1156a 22) (34). =A& E
“in the province of rhetoric as Aristotle defined it—is to find the common ground between rhetor and audience in attitudes and states of mind” (34). =E
He and Burke are thinking alike here. Burke believes one needs to identify with the audience and that identification is finding common ground.
“The writers this textbook imagines, and their audiences, are apparently apt to agree that emtotions play a useful role, but a potentially unsavory one” (35). =B
“The dominant impression after such a survey is that appeals to emotion are understood to be a kind of compromise for the postlapsarian world, infinitely dangerous and detached from rational process” (38).
“Similarly, cognitivist approaches to composition schematize the highly conscious, linear processes of rationality and largely ignore the unconscious and chaotic affective ones” (40). =B
“What would a textbook that took emotions seriously look like? It would not make composing look simple. It would recognize and provoke analysis of both the discourse of emotions and emotional discourse” (40). =B
“When Aristotle delineates three appeals in the Rhetoric—logos, pathos, ethos—he establishes not only a system of classification, but a principle of valuation for study by the generations of rhetoricians to follow him” (33).
“Aristotle understands, accepts, and promotes emotional appeals and devotes a major portion of his treastie to them” (33). =A
“He claims at the outset that ‘the man who is to be in command of [the pisteis] must, it is clear, be able to reason logically, to understand human characters and excellences, and to understand the emotions—that , to know what they are, their nature, their causes and the way in which they are excited’” (1156a 22) (34). =A& E
“in the province of rhetoric as Aristotle defined it—is to find the common ground between rhetor and audience in attitudes and states of mind” (34). =E
He and Burke are thinking alike here. Burke believes one needs to identify with the audience and that identification is finding common ground.
“The writers this textbook imagines, and their audiences, are apparently apt to agree that emtotions play a useful role, but a potentially unsavory one” (35). =B
“The dominant impression after such a survey is that appeals to emotion are understood to be a kind of compromise for the postlapsarian world, infinitely dangerous and detached from rational process” (38).
“Similarly, cognitivist approaches to composition schematize the highly conscious, linear processes of rationality and largely ignore the unconscious and chaotic affective ones” (40). =B
“What would a textbook that took emotions seriously look like? It would not make composing look simple. It would recognize and provoke analysis of both the discourse of emotions and emotional discourse” (40). =B
Thursday, February 18, 2010
Kerr, Tom. “The Feeling of What Happens in Departments
Kerr, Tom. “The Feeling of What Happens in Departments of English.” A way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion & Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/Cook:Portsmouth, NH. (2003). 23.
“And yet, what Brand observes of the writing classroom may also be said of English departments, material conditions notwithstanding: ‘when things are stalled. . .it is because of emotion. When things go well, it is also because of emotion (Brand 2000, 216).
“It is imperative that we understand emotion quite explicitly as symbolic communication, as a highly inflected semiotic system—a rhetoric of the body, if you will—that relies on signs and representations at both the molecular (interior, biochemical) and molar (exterior, behavioral) levels of the organism” (27).
“As for the second economy, emotional communication regulates the internal states of our organism, ‘providing increased blood flow to arteries in the legs so that muscles receive extra oxygen and glucose, in the case of a flight reaction, or changing heart and breathing rythms,’ in the case say, of presenting a paper before an audience (54). Emotions not only signal our intentions and reactions to others, they also tell our own bodies what to do and when to do it” (27).
“But the ideological manipulation of emotion takes on much finer hues and textures as well; the systemic, culturally sanctioned suppression of the emotions that one finds in departments of English serves as a good example (30).
“And yet, what Brand observes of the writing classroom may also be said of English departments, material conditions notwithstanding: ‘when things are stalled. . .it is because of emotion. When things go well, it is also because of emotion (Brand 2000, 216).
“It is imperative that we understand emotion quite explicitly as symbolic communication, as a highly inflected semiotic system—a rhetoric of the body, if you will—that relies on signs and representations at both the molecular (interior, biochemical) and molar (exterior, behavioral) levels of the organism” (27).
“As for the second economy, emotional communication regulates the internal states of our organism, ‘providing increased blood flow to arteries in the legs so that muscles receive extra oxygen and glucose, in the case of a flight reaction, or changing heart and breathing rythms,’ in the case say, of presenting a paper before an audience (54). Emotions not only signal our intentions and reactions to others, they also tell our own bodies what to do and when to do it” (27).
“But the ideological manipulation of emotion takes on much finer hues and textures as well; the systemic, culturally sanctioned suppression of the emotions that one finds in departments of English serves as a good example (30).
Quandahl, Ellen. “A Feeling for Aristotle A Way to Move
Quandahl, Ellen. “A Feeling for Aristotle: Emotion in the Sphere of Ethics” A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies. Eds. Dale Jacobs & Laura R. Micciche. Boyton/CooK: Portsmouth, NH.
“Aristotle.. . .A patient observer and analyst of culture who gives emotion a significant place in living well generally, in ethics and in politics” (12).
“This linking of rhetoric with ethics and moral psychology is historically long-standing” (12). =E
“So in Aristotle there is a significant connection and interplay of emotion with ethics as well as persuasion” (13). =E
And even though that is true, there is little or no mention of guilt. However, it is also proof that those who claim rhetoric shoud be, and has been based on logic alone, are off base” (13). =E
“1. ‘Thumos’ is a social force. Scholars have discovered a crucial hinge between emotions and ethics/politics in a Greek word associated with spirited-ness, and also with heart, or the seat or capacity for emotions, thumos” (13). =B & E.
(Barbara Koziak) “She reminds us of a conundrum in Plato—that, on the one hand, in his mythic, tripartite psychology, reason tames and controls the emotional part, but on the other hand, Plato analogizes philosophy with eros, so that knowing involves desire” (14).
“Koziak and others recognize that Aristotle fully opens this door, giving a significant place to emotion in moral conduct” (14). **=E
“Koziak argues that emotions of the Rhetoric are ‘desires for certain state of social realations’ (2000, 96). The capacity to feel these emotions could also be called a social capacity” (14). **=E
“the survey of emotions in the Rhetoric could be said to examine already developed ways in which people are moved in social situations” (15). **=E
“Rhetoricians have been clear that the realm of rhetoric comprises the messy areas in which judgments must be made even where there is not a precise science of inquiry and where nonexperts have to address complex issues” (16). ** =B & E.
“Cooper points out that the feeling of an emotion includes for Aristotle three central elements: distress or pleasure, its cause by the way things seem to one, and the social dimension that we have already seen—desire for some behavior in response or change in the social situation” (1999, 422)” (17). =B
“deliberate emotional education, then, ought to include deep thought about how institutions teach and manage emotion, and broad opportunities to learn and reflect on what happens when people feel in particular situations” (20). =A
“It is language study that allows us to see what happens when people feel this way, about this person, in this situation” (21).
“Aristotle.. . .A patient observer and analyst of culture who gives emotion a significant place in living well generally, in ethics and in politics” (12).
“This linking of rhetoric with ethics and moral psychology is historically long-standing” (12). =E
“So in Aristotle there is a significant connection and interplay of emotion with ethics as well as persuasion” (13). =E
And even though that is true, there is little or no mention of guilt. However, it is also proof that those who claim rhetoric shoud be, and has been based on logic alone, are off base” (13). =E
“1. ‘Thumos’ is a social force. Scholars have discovered a crucial hinge between emotions and ethics/politics in a Greek word associated with spirited-ness, and also with heart, or the seat or capacity for emotions, thumos” (13). =B & E.
(Barbara Koziak) “She reminds us of a conundrum in Plato—that, on the one hand, in his mythic, tripartite psychology, reason tames and controls the emotional part, but on the other hand, Plato analogizes philosophy with eros, so that knowing involves desire” (14).
“Koziak and others recognize that Aristotle fully opens this door, giving a significant place to emotion in moral conduct” (14). **=E
“Koziak argues that emotions of the Rhetoric are ‘desires for certain state of social realations’ (2000, 96). The capacity to feel these emotions could also be called a social capacity” (14). **=E
“the survey of emotions in the Rhetoric could be said to examine already developed ways in which people are moved in social situations” (15). **=E
“Rhetoricians have been clear that the realm of rhetoric comprises the messy areas in which judgments must be made even where there is not a precise science of inquiry and where nonexperts have to address complex issues” (16). ** =B & E.
“Cooper points out that the feeling of an emotion includes for Aristotle three central elements: distress or pleasure, its cause by the way things seem to one, and the social dimension that we have already seen—desire for some behavior in response or change in the social situation” (1999, 422)” (17). =B
“deliberate emotional education, then, ought to include deep thought about how institutions teach and manage emotion, and broad opportunities to learn and reflect on what happens when people feel in particular situations” (20). =A
“It is language study that allows us to see what happens when people feel this way, about this person, in this situation” (21).
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
Farrell, Thomas B. “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical
Farrell, Thomas B. “Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory” The Quarterly Journal of Speech. 62.1 (1975).
“In Aristotle’s early expansive vision, then, rhetoric was the art which employed the common knowledge of a particular audience to inform and guide reasoned judgments about matters of public interest” (1). -B
“Aristotle was able to posit a body of common knowledge as a natural corollary to his idealizations of human nature, the potential of human reason, and the norms and procedures of public decision making” (2). =B
“With each alteration in our conception of knowledge, then, the art of rhetoric—which seems to depend upon a kind of collective knowledge—altered its status and function accordingly” (2-3). =A
As we change, so does rhetoric. It bases itself around what is, for the time, considered reality. Now, reality is that women are not less than men nor do they have a special code of conduct.
“It is neither possible nor practical to exhaustively refute all conceptions of knowledge which once impeded the current inquiry; fortunately, it is also unnecessary. The contradictions of extreme realism, radical empiricism, and logical positivism are now clearly apparent to all but their most steadfast adherents. Contemporary philosophy has now moved away from the detached derivation of criteria for knowledge and toward more inclusive study of human activity in all its forms—even as this activity informs the process of scientific knowing itself (3).
=B & E
“Thomas Kuhn terms consensual agreements on a structured universe of discourse, ‘paradigms,’ and suggests that without such a consensual context, even the developed sciences would lose their rigor and analycity” (3). =B
“No criterion for knowledge can be polemically proclaimed; at the very least, it must require the cooperation of others in some form” (3). =B
Knowledge is created through an exchange of ideas, but is not handed down singularly. It must work in concert with other knowledge bases in order to create a genuinely knowledgable experience.
“The analytic rigor and synthetic precision of any body of knowledge, then, would seem to vary in direct relation to two interdependent factors:
(1) the degree of actual consensus on methods of investigation, procedures of analysis and operation of measurement.
(2) the knowers’ degree of detachment from human interests related to the object of knowledge” (4). =B & A
“I call this knowledge ‘social knowledge’ and define it as follows:
Social knowledge comprises conceptions of symbolic relationships among problems, persons, interests, and actions, which imply (when accepted) certain notions of preferable public behavior” (4). =B
“Social knowledge is a kind of general and symbolic relationship which acquires its rhetorical function when it is assumed to be shared by knowers in their unique capacity as audience. Whereas technical or specialized knowledge is actualized through its perceived correspondence to the external world, social knowledge is actualized through the decision and action of an audience (4). =B
“And rhetoric (barring the use of force) is the primary process by which social conduct is corrdinated” (5). =B & E
This is how conduct books work. They begin by pulling on social knowledge, and then using rhetoric to imply the importance of that knowledge and those rules.
‘social knowledge depends upon an ‘acquaintance with’ (to use James’ phrase) or a personal relationship to other actors in the social world” (5). =B & A
Thus if we all “know” something socially, it is because we know others who agree with that “knowing”. Burke’s theory of identity.
“the attribution of consensus is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for social knowledge to be rhetorically impactful” (78). =B
“By definition, then, the knowledge which is distinctly rhetorical in function—that is, social knowledge—must be based upon a consensus which is attributed rather than fully realized” (8). =B
“social knowledge becomes the emergent property of a collectivity. It is an attribution which is general in scope rather than abstract in epistemic status”(9). =B
“Rather than being fixed, permanent and static, therefore, social knowledge is transitional and generative” (9). =B & E
The collective owns the knowledge, like community, which is why the folklore in “Space on the side of the Road” works so well. It is all knowledge based on a community knowing, which then makes the rhetoric more effective.
“the most elusive and important characteristic of social knowledge. I refer to its affective or normative impact on decision-making” (10). =B
“More problematic is the tendency of mass media to publicize, even create social knowledge which forces options without suggesting actional outlets for mass concern” (11). =B
“The overarching function of social knowledge is to transform the society into a community” (11). =B & A
FOLKLORE!
“social knowledge helps define a ‘zone of relevance’ in matters of human choice’ (12). =B
“social knowledge is a way of imparting significance to the numerous ‘bits’ of information which are disseminated to the mass of public citizens” (12). =B
‘social knowledge allows each social actor to confront a set of generalized assumptions suggesting the relative priority of collective commitments held by others” (12). =B
“In Aristotle’s early expansive vision, then, rhetoric was the art which employed the common knowledge of a particular audience to inform and guide reasoned judgments about matters of public interest” (1). -B
“Aristotle was able to posit a body of common knowledge as a natural corollary to his idealizations of human nature, the potential of human reason, and the norms and procedures of public decision making” (2). =B
“With each alteration in our conception of knowledge, then, the art of rhetoric—which seems to depend upon a kind of collective knowledge—altered its status and function accordingly” (2-3). =A
As we change, so does rhetoric. It bases itself around what is, for the time, considered reality. Now, reality is that women are not less than men nor do they have a special code of conduct.
“It is neither possible nor practical to exhaustively refute all conceptions of knowledge which once impeded the current inquiry; fortunately, it is also unnecessary. The contradictions of extreme realism, radical empiricism, and logical positivism are now clearly apparent to all but their most steadfast adherents. Contemporary philosophy has now moved away from the detached derivation of criteria for knowledge and toward more inclusive study of human activity in all its forms—even as this activity informs the process of scientific knowing itself (3).
=B & E
“Thomas Kuhn terms consensual agreements on a structured universe of discourse, ‘paradigms,’ and suggests that without such a consensual context, even the developed sciences would lose their rigor and analycity” (3). =B
“No criterion for knowledge can be polemically proclaimed; at the very least, it must require the cooperation of others in some form” (3). =B
Knowledge is created through an exchange of ideas, but is not handed down singularly. It must work in concert with other knowledge bases in order to create a genuinely knowledgable experience.
“The analytic rigor and synthetic precision of any body of knowledge, then, would seem to vary in direct relation to two interdependent factors:
(1) the degree of actual consensus on methods of investigation, procedures of analysis and operation of measurement.
(2) the knowers’ degree of detachment from human interests related to the object of knowledge” (4). =B & A
“I call this knowledge ‘social knowledge’ and define it as follows:
Social knowledge comprises conceptions of symbolic relationships among problems, persons, interests, and actions, which imply (when accepted) certain notions of preferable public behavior” (4). =B
“Social knowledge is a kind of general and symbolic relationship which acquires its rhetorical function when it is assumed to be shared by knowers in their unique capacity as audience. Whereas technical or specialized knowledge is actualized through its perceived correspondence to the external world, social knowledge is actualized through the decision and action of an audience (4). =B
“And rhetoric (barring the use of force) is the primary process by which social conduct is corrdinated” (5). =B & E
This is how conduct books work. They begin by pulling on social knowledge, and then using rhetoric to imply the importance of that knowledge and those rules.
‘social knowledge depends upon an ‘acquaintance with’ (to use James’ phrase) or a personal relationship to other actors in the social world” (5). =B & A
Thus if we all “know” something socially, it is because we know others who agree with that “knowing”. Burke’s theory of identity.
“the attribution of consensus is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for social knowledge to be rhetorically impactful” (78). =B
“By definition, then, the knowledge which is distinctly rhetorical in function—that is, social knowledge—must be based upon a consensus which is attributed rather than fully realized” (8). =B
“social knowledge becomes the emergent property of a collectivity. It is an attribution which is general in scope rather than abstract in epistemic status”(9). =B
“Rather than being fixed, permanent and static, therefore, social knowledge is transitional and generative” (9). =B & E
The collective owns the knowledge, like community, which is why the folklore in “Space on the side of the Road” works so well. It is all knowledge based on a community knowing, which then makes the rhetoric more effective.
“the most elusive and important characteristic of social knowledge. I refer to its affective or normative impact on decision-making” (10). =B
“More problematic is the tendency of mass media to publicize, even create social knowledge which forces options without suggesting actional outlets for mass concern” (11). =B
“The overarching function of social knowledge is to transform the society into a community” (11). =B & A
FOLKLORE!
“social knowledge helps define a ‘zone of relevance’ in matters of human choice’ (12). =B
“social knowledge is a way of imparting significance to the numerous ‘bits’ of information which are disseminated to the mass of public citizens” (12). =B
‘social knowledge allows each social actor to confront a set of generalized assumptions suggesting the relative priority of collective commitments held by others” (12). =B
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Augustine. “On Christian Doctrine: Book IV”
Augustine. “On Christian Doctrine: Book IV” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings
From Classical Times to the Present. Eds., Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzburg Bedford: Boston 2001.
“3. For since throught the art of rhetoric both truth and falsehood are pleaded, who would be so bold as to say that against falsehood, truth as regards its own dfenders ought to stand unarmed, so that, forsooth, those who attempt to plead false causes know from the beginning how to make their audience well-disposed, attentive, and that the former utter their lies concisely, clearly, with the appearance of truth, and that the later state the truth in a way that is wearisome to listen to, not clear to understand, and finally, not pleasant to believe;” (457). =B & E
"Nay, more I believe there are scarcely any who can do both things, viz., speak well, and in order to do so, think of the rules of oratory while speaking” (457). =B
“21. And indeed many more things which pertain to the rules of eloquence can be discovered in this same passage which we have taken as an example. But its value lies not so much in the instruction it affords a good audience if it be analyzed carefully, as in the sentiment it enkindles if it be read with feeling” (464). B & E
Augustine is talking about invoking feeling in his audience. He specifically talks about evoking emotion through emotion.
“For though one gives pleasure when he clears up matters that need to be made understood, he becomes wearisome when he keeps hammering at things which are already understood, at least to those men whose whole expectation was centered in the solution of the difficulty in the matter under discussion” (465). =B
“27. And so, a well-known orator has said, and has said truly thant an orator ought to speak in such a way as to instruct, to please, and to persuade” (466). B & E
“It belongs, therefore, to the duty of the teacher not only to make clear obscure matters, and to solve the difficulties in question, but also while this is being done, to anticipate other questions” (472). M&E
“42. The grand style of speaking differs from this moderate style especially in that this is not so much adorned by ornate expressions, as rendered passionate by the heart’s emotions” (474). B & E.
He’s speaking directly to the use of emotion to evoke response, move the audience, etc.
“47. The well-known encomium of virgininity in Cyprian is an example of the moderate style. ‘Now our discourse directs itself to the virgins, who as their honor is higher, are therefore our greater care. They are the flower of the tree of the Church, the beauty and ornament of spiritual grace, its bright natural virtue; of its praise and honor, a work pure and untarnished, the image of God, answering to the sancity of the Lord, the brighter portion of the flock of Christ” (476). =B & E
Did this very strange obsession with virginity, strange because it is praised not as a natural state, but as a higher state of being, contribute to the obsession we now know as pedophilia?
“51. No one should suppose that is its against the rule to mingle these three styles. On the contrary as far as it can properly be done, one should vary his diction by using all three” (478). =B
Syles = grand, moderate, and subdued.
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From Classical Times to the Present. Eds., Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzburg Bedford: Boston 2001.
“3. For since throught the art of rhetoric both truth and falsehood are pleaded, who would be so bold as to say that against falsehood, truth as regards its own dfenders ought to stand unarmed, so that, forsooth, those who attempt to plead false causes know from the beginning how to make their audience well-disposed, attentive, and that the former utter their lies concisely, clearly, with the appearance of truth, and that the later state the truth in a way that is wearisome to listen to, not clear to understand, and finally, not pleasant to believe;” (457). =B & E
"Nay, more I believe there are scarcely any who can do both things, viz., speak well, and in order to do so, think of the rules of oratory while speaking” (457). =B
“21. And indeed many more things which pertain to the rules of eloquence can be discovered in this same passage which we have taken as an example. But its value lies not so much in the instruction it affords a good audience if it be analyzed carefully, as in the sentiment it enkindles if it be read with feeling” (464). B & E
Augustine is talking about invoking feeling in his audience. He specifically talks about evoking emotion through emotion.
“For though one gives pleasure when he clears up matters that need to be made understood, he becomes wearisome when he keeps hammering at things which are already understood, at least to those men whose whole expectation was centered in the solution of the difficulty in the matter under discussion” (465). =B
“27. And so, a well-known orator has said, and has said truly thant an orator ought to speak in such a way as to instruct, to please, and to persuade” (466). B & E
“It belongs, therefore, to the duty of the teacher not only to make clear obscure matters, and to solve the difficulties in question, but also while this is being done, to anticipate other questions” (472). M&E
“42. The grand style of speaking differs from this moderate style especially in that this is not so much adorned by ornate expressions, as rendered passionate by the heart’s emotions” (474). B & E.
He’s speaking directly to the use of emotion to evoke response, move the audience, etc.
“47. The well-known encomium of virgininity in Cyprian is an example of the moderate style. ‘Now our discourse directs itself to the virgins, who as their honor is higher, are therefore our greater care. They are the flower of the tree of the Church, the beauty and ornament of spiritual grace, its bright natural virtue; of its praise and honor, a work pure and untarnished, the image of God, answering to the sancity of the Lord, the brighter portion of the flock of Christ” (476). =B & E
Did this very strange obsession with virginity, strange because it is praised not as a natural state, but as a higher state of being, contribute to the obsession we now know as pedophilia?
“51. No one should suppose that is its against the rule to mingle these three styles. On the contrary as far as it can properly be done, one should vary his diction by using all three” (478). =B
Syles = grand, moderate, and subdued.
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Astell, Mary. “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies
Astell, Mary. “A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings From Classical Times to the Present. Eds., Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzburg. Bedford: Boston 2001.
“It is not enough to wish and to would it, or t’afford a faint Encomium upon what you pretend is beyond your Power; Imitation is the heartiest Praise you can give and is a Debt which Justice requires to be paid to every worthy Action” (847). =E
“If you approve, Why don’t you follow? Andi if you Wish, Why shou’d you not Endeavour? Especially since that wou’d reduce your Wishes to Act, and make you com glorious Examples of them” (847). =E
Speaking directly to what she believes should inspire women to act. She reminds me of Emerson in her belief that action is necessary to prove worth.
“Firmness and strength of Mind will carry us thro all these little persecutions, which may create us some uneasiness for a while, but will afterwards end in our Glory and Triumph” (848). =E
Even if women were looked down on for using their minds, they should push through. Emerson, King, Sojouner Truth.
"Alas, Human Knowledge is at best defective, and always progressive, so that she who knows the most has only this advantage, that she has made a little more speed than her Neighbors” (850).
Astell recognizes that pride works on women too. The woman is a veritable bulldozer when it comes to rhetoric.
“we hope that our Proposition was such that all impartial Readers are convinc’d it wou’d answer the Design, that is, tend very much to the real advantage and improvement of the Ladies” (851).
“So that when we have cast up our Account and estimated the Present Advantages that false Arguings bring us, I fear what we have got by a Pretence to Truth, won’t be found to countervail the loss we shall sustain by the Discovery that it was no more. Which may induce us (if other Considerations will not) to be wary in receiving any Proposition our selves, and restrain us from being forward to impose our Sentiments on others” (852).
“I shall not therefore recommend under the name of Rhetoric an Art of speaking floridly on all subjects, and of dressing up Error and Impertinence in quaint and taking garb” (852).
Her appeals range from the emotional to the completely logical. By referring to “dressing” up error she hits home with the ladies. Her idea of saying that even if it looks good, it has to be good, goes back to Aristotle.
“but we shou’d fold up our Thoughts so closely and neatly, expressing them in such significant tho few words, as that the Readers Mind may easily open and enlarge them” (853). =E
Again, she is directly hitting on things women were used to dealing with, in this case folding things to make them more compact.
“Neither Reason nor Wit entertain us if they are driven beyond a certain pitch, and Pleasure it self is offensive if it be not judiciously dispenc’d” (854). =B
“So that to guess what success we are like to have, we need only suppose our selves in the place of those we Address to, and consider how such Discourse wou’d operate on us, if we had their Infirmities and Thoughts about us” (854). =E & M
Directly tapping into empathy as a way of addressing an audience.
"We shou’d diligently watch for Opportunities, and carefully improve them, accommodating our Discourse to the Understanding and Genius of all we cou’d hope to do good to” (855). =E & M
“I have made no distinction in what has been said between Speaking and Writing, because tho they are talents which do not always meet, they there is no material difference between ‘em” (856).
“For it is little purpose to Think well and speak well, unless we Live well, this is our great Affair and truest Excellency, the other are no further to be regarded than as they may assist us in this. She who does not draw this Inference from her Studies has Thought in vain, her notions are Erroneous and Mistaken” (858).
Again, she reminds me of Emerson in her desire not only to teach women to think on their own, but to act on their own thoughts!
“Nor will Knowledge lie dead upon their hands who have no Children to Instruct; the whole World is a single Lady’s Family, her opportunities of doing good are not lessen’d but encreas’d by her being unconfin’d” (860).
This lady is good.
“It is not enough to wish and to would it, or t’afford a faint Encomium upon what you pretend is beyond your Power; Imitation is the heartiest Praise you can give and is a Debt which Justice requires to be paid to every worthy Action” (847). =E
“If you approve, Why don’t you follow? Andi if you Wish, Why shou’d you not Endeavour? Especially since that wou’d reduce your Wishes to Act, and make you com glorious Examples of them” (847). =E
Speaking directly to what she believes should inspire women to act. She reminds me of Emerson in her belief that action is necessary to prove worth.
“Firmness and strength of Mind will carry us thro all these little persecutions, which may create us some uneasiness for a while, but will afterwards end in our Glory and Triumph” (848). =E
Even if women were looked down on for using their minds, they should push through. Emerson, King, Sojouner Truth.
"Alas, Human Knowledge is at best defective, and always progressive, so that she who knows the most has only this advantage, that she has made a little more speed than her Neighbors” (850).
Astell recognizes that pride works on women too. The woman is a veritable bulldozer when it comes to rhetoric.
“we hope that our Proposition was such that all impartial Readers are convinc’d it wou’d answer the Design, that is, tend very much to the real advantage and improvement of the Ladies” (851).
“So that when we have cast up our Account and estimated the Present Advantages that false Arguings bring us, I fear what we have got by a Pretence to Truth, won’t be found to countervail the loss we shall sustain by the Discovery that it was no more. Which may induce us (if other Considerations will not) to be wary in receiving any Proposition our selves, and restrain us from being forward to impose our Sentiments on others” (852).
“I shall not therefore recommend under the name of Rhetoric an Art of speaking floridly on all subjects, and of dressing up Error and Impertinence in quaint and taking garb” (852).
Her appeals range from the emotional to the completely logical. By referring to “dressing” up error she hits home with the ladies. Her idea of saying that even if it looks good, it has to be good, goes back to Aristotle.
“but we shou’d fold up our Thoughts so closely and neatly, expressing them in such significant tho few words, as that the Readers Mind may easily open and enlarge them” (853). =E
Again, she is directly hitting on things women were used to dealing with, in this case folding things to make them more compact.
“Neither Reason nor Wit entertain us if they are driven beyond a certain pitch, and Pleasure it self is offensive if it be not judiciously dispenc’d” (854). =B
“So that to guess what success we are like to have, we need only suppose our selves in the place of those we Address to, and consider how such Discourse wou’d operate on us, if we had their Infirmities and Thoughts about us” (854). =E & M
Directly tapping into empathy as a way of addressing an audience.
"We shou’d diligently watch for Opportunities, and carefully improve them, accommodating our Discourse to the Understanding and Genius of all we cou’d hope to do good to” (855). =E & M
“I have made no distinction in what has been said between Speaking and Writing, because tho they are talents which do not always meet, they there is no material difference between ‘em” (856).
“For it is little purpose to Think well and speak well, unless we Live well, this is our great Affair and truest Excellency, the other are no further to be regarded than as they may assist us in this. She who does not draw this Inference from her Studies has Thought in vain, her notions are Erroneous and Mistaken” (858).
Again, she reminds me of Emerson in her desire not only to teach women to think on their own, but to act on their own thoughts!
“Nor will Knowledge lie dead upon their hands who have no Children to Instruct; the whole World is a single Lady’s Family, her opportunities of doing good are not lessen’d but encreas’d by her being unconfin’d” (860).
This lady is good.
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. Metaphors We Live By
Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago UP: Chicago. 1980,
“Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like” (3). =B
“Because the metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talka bout that aspect of the concept is systematic” (7). =B
“The metaphorical concepts TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A RESOURCE and TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY form a single system based on subcategorization, since in our society money is a limited resource and limited resources are valuable commodities. These subcategorization relationships characterize entailment relationships between the metaphors” (9).=M
“Reddy obersves that our language about language is structured roughly by the following complex metaphor:
Ideas (or meanings) are objects.
Linguistic expressions are containers.
Communication is sending. =B & M
Since we put such a physical face on intangible objects such as ideas and language, we are using our minds to create links between physicality and thought.
“metaphorical concepts can be extended beyond the range of ordinary literal ways of thinking and talking into the range of what is called figurative, poetic, colorful, or fanciful though and language” (13). =B & M
This is how we stretch the understanding of certain ideas. It is also how we communicate the understanding. Burke?
“there is another kind of metaphorical concept, one that does not structure one concept in terms of another but instead organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another. We will call these orientational metaphors, since most of them have to do with special orientation: (14). =B
“Most of our fundamental concepts are organized in terms of one or more spatialization metaphors (17). =B
“The most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture” (22). B & A
“The various subcultures of a mainstream culture share basic values but give them different priorities” (23). =B
“our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is ways of viewing events activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances (25). =B
“We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces. Thus we also view them as containers with an inside and an outside” (29). =B
“Perhaps the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object is further specified as being a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics and activities” (33). =B & M
“The point here is that personification is a general category that covers a very wide range of metaphors, each picking out different aspects of a person or a way of looking at a person” (34) =B
“we are using one entity to refer to another that is related to it. This is a case of what we will call metonymy” (35). =B
Delving deeper into apparent and hidden metaphors goes toward discovering motive. Burke.
(called synecdoche by rhetoricians).
“The conceptual systems of culture and religions are metaphorical in nature” (41). =B
Women equal Eve equal sin?
“We claim that most of our normal conceptual system is metaphorically structured; that is, most concepts are partially understood in terms of other concepts” (56). =B
“metaphors allow us to conceptualize our emotions in more sharply defined terms and also relate them to other concepts having to do with general well-being . . .” (58).
“Structural metaphors allow us to do much more than just orient concepts, refer to them, quantify them, etc., as we do with simple orientational and ontological metaphors; they allow us, in addition, to use one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another.
Like orientational and ontological metaphors, structural metaphors are grounded in systematic correlations within our experience” (61).
“Standard theories of meaning assume that all of our complex concepts can be analyzed into undecomposable primitives. Such primitives are taken to be the ‘building blocks’ of meaning. (69).
“We conceptualize changes of this kind—from one state into another, having a new form and function—in terms of the metaphor THE OBJECT COMES OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE. That is why the expression out of is used. . .” (73).
This is the same with “into”. A young woman who is marriageable and pure “turns into” a social outcast when she is sullied by her own choice or another’s. Conduct books.
“Another way we can ceptualize making is by elaborating on direct manipulation, using another metaphor: THE SUBSTANCE GOES INTO THE OBJECT.” (73). =B
“the concept of CAUSATION is based on the prototype of DIRECT MANIPULATION, which emerges directly from our experience (75). =B
Eve at the apple and all women turned into evil.
Conversation dimensions of structure:
“Participants: The participants are of a certain natural kind, namely, people.
“Parts: The parts consists of a certain natural kind of activity, namely, talking.
Stages: beginning middle and end
Linear sequence: Participants take turns.
Causation: The finish of one turn is expected to result in the beginning of the next turn.
Purpose: Polite social interaction. [PARAPHRASE] (79). =B
“A ONE-PARTY RATIONAL ARGUMENT is a specific branch of the general concept ARGUMENT and, as such, has many special constraints on it” (88). =B
Content: enough supporting evidence.
Progress: premises to conclusion
Structure: appropriate logical connections among the various parts.
Strength: The ability of the argument to withstand assault depends on the evidence and tightness of logical connections.
Basicness: Some claims are more important to maintain and defend than others, since subsequent claims will be based up-on them.
Obviousness: In any argument there will be things which are not obvious and need to be identified and explored.
Directness: The force of an argument can depend on how straightforwardly you move from premisis to conclusion.
Clairty: What you are claiming and the connections must be clear. (88-9). [PARAPHRASE]
Can we say write a paper?
“We can get some idea of the mechanism of coherence within a single metaphorical structuring by starting with the metaphor AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY” (89). =B
“Because we conceptualize linguistic form in spatial terms, it is possible for certain spaceial metaphors to apply directly to the form of a sentence, as we conceive of spatially”(126).
“Thus, they can give new meaning to our pasts, to our daily activity, and to what we know and believe” (139). (metaphors). =B
Metaphors allow for an expansion of understanding and that expansion allows for new knowledge to be taken in, synthesized, and reformed.
“Ontological metaphors also make similarities possible” (146).
“TIME IS A SUBSTANCE and LABOR IS A SUBSTANCE allows us to view them both as being similar to physical resources and hence similar to each other” (147.)
“Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like” (3). =B
“Because the metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talka bout that aspect of the concept is systematic” (7). =B
“The metaphorical concepts TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A RESOURCE and TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY form a single system based on subcategorization, since in our society money is a limited resource and limited resources are valuable commodities. These subcategorization relationships characterize entailment relationships between the metaphors” (9).=M
“Reddy obersves that our language about language is structured roughly by the following complex metaphor:
Ideas (or meanings) are objects.
Linguistic expressions are containers.
Communication is sending. =B & M
Since we put such a physical face on intangible objects such as ideas and language, we are using our minds to create links between physicality and thought.
“metaphorical concepts can be extended beyond the range of ordinary literal ways of thinking and talking into the range of what is called figurative, poetic, colorful, or fanciful though and language” (13). =B & M
This is how we stretch the understanding of certain ideas. It is also how we communicate the understanding. Burke?
“there is another kind of metaphorical concept, one that does not structure one concept in terms of another but instead organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another. We will call these orientational metaphors, since most of them have to do with special orientation: (14). =B
“Most of our fundamental concepts are organized in terms of one or more spatialization metaphors (17). =B
“The most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture” (22). B & A
“The various subcultures of a mainstream culture share basic values but give them different priorities” (23). =B
“our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is ways of viewing events activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances (25). =B
“We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are bounded by surfaces. Thus we also view them as containers with an inside and an outside” (29). =B
“Perhaps the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object is further specified as being a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics and activities” (33). =B & M
“The point here is that personification is a general category that covers a very wide range of metaphors, each picking out different aspects of a person or a way of looking at a person” (34) =B
“we are using one entity to refer to another that is related to it. This is a case of what we will call metonymy” (35). =B
Delving deeper into apparent and hidden metaphors goes toward discovering motive. Burke.
(called synecdoche by rhetoricians).
“The conceptual systems of culture and religions are metaphorical in nature” (41). =B
Women equal Eve equal sin?
“We claim that most of our normal conceptual system is metaphorically structured; that is, most concepts are partially understood in terms of other concepts” (56). =B
“metaphors allow us to conceptualize our emotions in more sharply defined terms and also relate them to other concepts having to do with general well-being . . .” (58).
“Structural metaphors allow us to do much more than just orient concepts, refer to them, quantify them, etc., as we do with simple orientational and ontological metaphors; they allow us, in addition, to use one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another.
Like orientational and ontological metaphors, structural metaphors are grounded in systematic correlations within our experience” (61).
“Standard theories of meaning assume that all of our complex concepts can be analyzed into undecomposable primitives. Such primitives are taken to be the ‘building blocks’ of meaning. (69).
“We conceptualize changes of this kind—from one state into another, having a new form and function—in terms of the metaphor THE OBJECT COMES OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE. That is why the expression out of is used. . .” (73).
This is the same with “into”. A young woman who is marriageable and pure “turns into” a social outcast when she is sullied by her own choice or another’s. Conduct books.
“Another way we can ceptualize making is by elaborating on direct manipulation, using another metaphor: THE SUBSTANCE GOES INTO THE OBJECT.” (73). =B
“the concept of CAUSATION is based on the prototype of DIRECT MANIPULATION, which emerges directly from our experience (75). =B
Eve at the apple and all women turned into evil.
Conversation dimensions of structure:
“Participants: The participants are of a certain natural kind, namely, people.
“Parts: The parts consists of a certain natural kind of activity, namely, talking.
Stages: beginning middle and end
Linear sequence: Participants take turns.
Causation: The finish of one turn is expected to result in the beginning of the next turn.
Purpose: Polite social interaction. [PARAPHRASE] (79). =B
“A ONE-PARTY RATIONAL ARGUMENT is a specific branch of the general concept ARGUMENT and, as such, has many special constraints on it” (88). =B
Content: enough supporting evidence.
Progress: premises to conclusion
Structure: appropriate logical connections among the various parts.
Strength: The ability of the argument to withstand assault depends on the evidence and tightness of logical connections.
Basicness: Some claims are more important to maintain and defend than others, since subsequent claims will be based up-on them.
Obviousness: In any argument there will be things which are not obvious and need to be identified and explored.
Directness: The force of an argument can depend on how straightforwardly you move from premisis to conclusion.
Clairty: What you are claiming and the connections must be clear. (88-9). [PARAPHRASE]
Can we say write a paper?
“We can get some idea of the mechanism of coherence within a single metaphorical structuring by starting with the metaphor AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY” (89). =B
“Because we conceptualize linguistic form in spatial terms, it is possible for certain spaceial metaphors to apply directly to the form of a sentence, as we conceive of spatially”(126).
“Thus, they can give new meaning to our pasts, to our daily activity, and to what we know and believe” (139). (metaphors). =B
Metaphors allow for an expansion of understanding and that expansion allows for new knowledge to be taken in, synthesized, and reformed.
“Ontological metaphors also make similarities possible” (146).
“TIME IS A SUBSTANCE and LABOR IS A SUBSTANCE allows us to view them both as being similar to physical resources and hence similar to each other” (147.)
Monday, February 8, 2010
Larson, Richard L. “Classifying Discourse:Rhetoric and Modern
Larson, Richard L. “Classifying Discourse: Limitations and Alternatives” Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse. Southern Illinois UP: Carbondale. 1984.
“Cicero and Quintilian accepted and elaborated in their own way the division of rhetorical discourse into kinds, and further divided into classes the various questions that rhetorical discourse treats) = B
“A recent inquirty into one effort to categorize discourse is Rober Connors’ ‘The Rise and Fall of the Modes of Discourse. Connors locates the beginnings of the theory of ‘modes’ narration, description, exposition, argument—“ (204). =B
“But whether or not one agrees with Connors that the ‘modes’ are dead or moribund, the impulse to organize thinking and discussion about discourse by finding systems of classification are very much alive” (204). =B
“But probably the best plan known today for dividing up the members of the universe of discourse was advanced by James Kinneavy in A Theory of Discourse” (205). =B
*communications triangle—James Kinneavy
Apex-writer Second apex—the audience Third apex—subject of discourse. (206).
“The ‘modes’ as Frank D’Angelo observed in A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric, arise from the recognition that writers do ineed sometimes describe, theydo sometime narrate, they do sometimes explain, and they do sometimes hope to persuade—“ (206).
“topi (procedures for generating or arranging data for use in discourse) (205). =B
“The limitations in these categories of discourse do not emerge, then, from theorists’ derivations of the categories. Rather, they emerge from the inferences and conclusions drawn from those origins: that a finished piece of discourse can be classified into a box on a taxonomic chart; that in so classifying, a theorist has made a useful statement about that piece of discourse; and –even more significant—that one can employ these categories to erect a structure for teaching others to produce discourse” (207). = B & M
“Placing pieces of discourse into boxes on taxonomies, I would argue, fairls to respond to a reader’s experience of the piece as read. And for those who teach composing, the advantage offered by these taxonomies—the advantage of helping to formulate a neat convenient curriculum—is an illusory advantage” (209).
“Moffett identifies two dimensions along which any discourse can be defined: 1) the distance of writer from reader and the relative familiarity of writer with reader (the closest audience ot the writer is the writer himself or herself; the most distant is a large variegated audience whose members are unknown to the writer0; 2) the degree to which the materials of discourse are abstracted from immediate experience—what Mofftt calls their ‘abstractive altitude’ (210).
“But devising one or two scales is not a self-evidently preferable replacement for building taxonomies of discourse. The points ona single scale can too easily become the boxes in a taxonomy” (211). =B
“I think I can identify seven dimensions of discourse, each capable of being described as a scale or continuum along which a piece can be located.
1) The occasion or stimulous for writing
2) Readers’ expectations.
3) The distance, character, and attitudes of the audience.
4) The writer’s goal—the reaction or response desired in the readers by the writer.
5) The abstractive altitude of the subject matter; (direct sensory experience to statements about events that might or ought to occur later).
6) The density of detail required.
7) The extent to which the individual writer’s idiosyncratic perceptions, comments, and feelings permeate, or can permeate the discourse.
“Cicero and Quintilian accepted and elaborated in their own way the division of rhetorical discourse into kinds, and further divided into classes the various questions that rhetorical discourse treats) = B
“A recent inquirty into one effort to categorize discourse is Rober Connors’ ‘The Rise and Fall of the Modes of Discourse. Connors locates the beginnings of the theory of ‘modes’ narration, description, exposition, argument—“ (204). =B
“But whether or not one agrees with Connors that the ‘modes’ are dead or moribund, the impulse to organize thinking and discussion about discourse by finding systems of classification are very much alive” (204). =B
“But probably the best plan known today for dividing up the members of the universe of discourse was advanced by James Kinneavy in A Theory of Discourse” (205). =B
*communications triangle—James Kinneavy
Apex-writer Second apex—the audience Third apex—subject of discourse. (206).
“The ‘modes’ as Frank D’Angelo observed in A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric, arise from the recognition that writers do ineed sometimes describe, theydo sometime narrate, they do sometimes explain, and they do sometimes hope to persuade—“ (206).
“topi (procedures for generating or arranging data for use in discourse) (205). =B
“The limitations in these categories of discourse do not emerge, then, from theorists’ derivations of the categories. Rather, they emerge from the inferences and conclusions drawn from those origins: that a finished piece of discourse can be classified into a box on a taxonomic chart; that in so classifying, a theorist has made a useful statement about that piece of discourse; and –even more significant—that one can employ these categories to erect a structure for teaching others to produce discourse” (207). = B & M
“Placing pieces of discourse into boxes on taxonomies, I would argue, fairls to respond to a reader’s experience of the piece as read. And for those who teach composing, the advantage offered by these taxonomies—the advantage of helping to formulate a neat convenient curriculum—is an illusory advantage” (209).
“Moffett identifies two dimensions along which any discourse can be defined: 1) the distance of writer from reader and the relative familiarity of writer with reader (the closest audience ot the writer is the writer himself or herself; the most distant is a large variegated audience whose members are unknown to the writer0; 2) the degree to which the materials of discourse are abstracted from immediate experience—what Mofftt calls their ‘abstractive altitude’ (210).
“But devising one or two scales is not a self-evidently preferable replacement for building taxonomies of discourse. The points ona single scale can too easily become the boxes in a taxonomy” (211). =B
“I think I can identify seven dimensions of discourse, each capable of being described as a scale or continuum along which a piece can be located.
1) The occasion or stimulous for writing
2) Readers’ expectations.
3) The distance, character, and attitudes of the audience.
4) The writer’s goal—the reaction or response desired in the readers by the writer.
5) The abstractive altitude of the subject matter; (direct sensory experience to statements about events that might or ought to occur later).
6) The density of detail required.
7) The extent to which the individual writer’s idiosyncratic perceptions, comments, and feelings permeate, or can permeate the discourse.
Graves, Richard L. “Symmetrical Form and the RhetoricRhetoric and Modern
Graves, Richard L. “Symmetrical Form and the Rhetoric of the Sentence” Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse. Southern Illinois UP: Carbondale. 1984.
“’Gorgianic’ is said to be there only for effect or to make an impression, a thin veneer with no substance at all” (170). =B [the concept of symmetry within a sentence]
“Moreover we see the concept of symmetry expressed everywhere, all around us in all kinds of human institutions” (171). =B
“Thus seens, symmetry is not merely a cold, static form, but rather, a potentially dynamic, life-giving force” (172). =B
“Attneave was interested in studying, in quantitative terms, a belief long held by Gestalt physchologists, namely that symmetry has a positive effect on memory” (172). =B
“Attneave’s experiments and Burke’s comments on innate form suggest the potential fruitfulness of efforts to develop a syntactic rhetoric based on symmetry and parallelism—one which could, in combination with other related activities, serve as a powerful heuristic tool” (174). =B
“Parallelism is shown as consisting of four major categories: 10the repetition of key words, 2) the use of opposite words, 3) the repetition of grammatical elements, and 4) combinations of these, in which selected elements function together” (174). =B
“’Gorgianic’ is said to be there only for effect or to make an impression, a thin veneer with no substance at all” (170). =B [the concept of symmetry within a sentence]
“Moreover we see the concept of symmetry expressed everywhere, all around us in all kinds of human institutions” (171). =B
“Thus seens, symmetry is not merely a cold, static form, but rather, a potentially dynamic, life-giving force” (172). =B
“Attneave was interested in studying, in quantitative terms, a belief long held by Gestalt physchologists, namely that symmetry has a positive effect on memory” (172). =B
“Attneave’s experiments and Burke’s comments on innate form suggest the potential fruitfulness of efforts to develop a syntactic rhetoric based on symmetry and parallelism—one which could, in combination with other related activities, serve as a powerful heuristic tool” (174). =B
“Parallelism is shown as consisting of four major categories: 10the repetition of key words, 2) the use of opposite words, 3) the repetition of grammatical elements, and 4) combinations of these, in which selected elements function together” (174). =B
Johnson, Nan. “Ethos and the Aims of Rhetoric” Essays on Classical
Johnson, Nan. “Ethos and the Aims of Rhetoric” Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse. Southern Illinois UP: Carbondale. 1984.
“ In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates observes that “the supreme object of a man’s efforts in public and private life must be the reality rather than the appearance of goodness” (99). =B
“In Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus, the role of rhetoric is defined as the instruction of ideal truth. Plato proposes in Gorgias that the true aim of oratory should be the ‘moral good,’ not merely persuasion as an end in itself” (99). =B
“Dialectic discovers or identifies ideal truth while rhetoric provides instruction for the community about the application of philosophy in life” (100). =B & M
“Persuasion through the spoken word is of three kinds; ethos, “the personal character of the speaker”; pathos, “putting the audience into a certain frame of mind”; and logos, ‘the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself’ (101). = B
“Aristotle perceives excellence or the Good as perfection of form possible through the effects of individual acts and mutual understanding; Plato defines the Good as an ideal which is only revealed to us in philosophical inquiry or spiritual edification” (103). =B
“Quntilian perceives rhetoric as an ethical activity which grounds citizens in “the priniciples of upright and honorable living” (103). =B
“Rhetoric is presented in De Oratore (55 B.C.) as the art of speaking well, and Cicero outlines the province of oratory or “eloquence” to be matters relevant to the maintenance of ‘peace and tranquility’ in communities and nations” (104). =B
“While Campbell evaluates ethos as a strategy in terms of what is ‘natural’ Blair assesses the significance of ethos and rhetorical principles in general with regard to how expression advances Taste” (108)” = B
“In the rhetorics of Campbell and Blair we see how classical definitions of the practical and ethical functions of ethos are adapted to popular philosophical views of the eighteenth century and to expanded notions of the province of rhetoric” (109). =B
“Whatley defines rhetoric as an ‘architectural’ art of composing arguments, and he defines ethos as a strategy of gaining sympathy. Like Campbell, Whatley sees sympathy as the key to moving the Will to action, and he defines ethos as ‘an impression produced by the projection of good sense, good principle and Good Will” (109-10).
“Channing shares Blair’s view that sincerity is a prerequisite to the composition and delivery of public address” (110). =B
“The concept of ethos rarely appears in current texts by name. Rather, it is discussed under such varied stylistic headings as ‘tone’ ‘writer’s voice’ ‘personal appeal’, ‘attitude,’ ‘persona,’ and ‘credibility.’ (112).
“One of the major goals of rhetoricians such as Richard Weaver and Wayne Booth has been to restore a balance between pragmatic and objective ideals as a basis for rhetorical theory and practice” (113).
“ In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates observes that “the supreme object of a man’s efforts in public and private life must be the reality rather than the appearance of goodness” (99). =B
“In Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus, the role of rhetoric is defined as the instruction of ideal truth. Plato proposes in Gorgias that the true aim of oratory should be the ‘moral good,’ not merely persuasion as an end in itself” (99). =B
“Dialectic discovers or identifies ideal truth while rhetoric provides instruction for the community about the application of philosophy in life” (100). =B & M
“Persuasion through the spoken word is of three kinds; ethos, “the personal character of the speaker”; pathos, “putting the audience into a certain frame of mind”; and logos, ‘the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself’ (101). = B
“Aristotle perceives excellence or the Good as perfection of form possible through the effects of individual acts and mutual understanding; Plato defines the Good as an ideal which is only revealed to us in philosophical inquiry or spiritual edification” (103). =B
“Quntilian perceives rhetoric as an ethical activity which grounds citizens in “the priniciples of upright and honorable living” (103). =B
“Rhetoric is presented in De Oratore (55 B.C.) as the art of speaking well, and Cicero outlines the province of oratory or “eloquence” to be matters relevant to the maintenance of ‘peace and tranquility’ in communities and nations” (104). =B
“While Campbell evaluates ethos as a strategy in terms of what is ‘natural’ Blair assesses the significance of ethos and rhetorical principles in general with regard to how expression advances Taste” (108)” = B
“In the rhetorics of Campbell and Blair we see how classical definitions of the practical and ethical functions of ethos are adapted to popular philosophical views of the eighteenth century and to expanded notions of the province of rhetoric” (109). =B
“Whatley defines rhetoric as an ‘architectural’ art of composing arguments, and he defines ethos as a strategy of gaining sympathy. Like Campbell, Whatley sees sympathy as the key to moving the Will to action, and he defines ethos as ‘an impression produced by the projection of good sense, good principle and Good Will” (109-10).
“Channing shares Blair’s view that sincerity is a prerequisite to the composition and delivery of public address” (110). =B
“The concept of ethos rarely appears in current texts by name. Rather, it is discussed under such varied stylistic headings as ‘tone’ ‘writer’s voice’ ‘personal appeal’, ‘attitude,’ ‘persona,’ and ‘credibility.’ (112).
“One of the major goals of rhetoricians such as Richard Weaver and Wayne Booth has been to restore a balance between pragmatic and objective ideals as a basis for rhetorical theory and practice” (113).
Golden, James Plato Essays on Classical Rhetoric
Golden, James L. “Plato Revisited: A Theory of Discourse for all Seasons” Connors, Robert J., Ede, Lisa, S., and Lunsford, Andrea A. Eds. Essays on Classical Rhetoricand Modern Discourse. Southern Illinois UP: Carbondale. 1984.
“Plato, first of all, was a highly significant thinker who recognized the centrality of discourse in its myriad forms, not only in the doing of philosophy but in the conducting of human affairs” (17). =B
“When examining Plato’s commitment to the value of discourse, it is incumbent on us to appreciate the broad scope which his theory of rhetoric entails. Rhetoric, he held, embraces any form of discourse designed to win the soul” (18). =B & A.
“It is evident, therefore, that Plato, like Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelman in the modern era, saw the need to place the interpersonal communication pattern within the sphere of rhetoric” (18). =B
“Further proof of Plato’s willingness to regard public communication, despite its partiality for an uninterrupted flow of discourse, as a legitimate and vital part of rhetoric, is his occasional practice of constructing orations as integral parts of his dialogues” (18). =B
“A second important aaspect of Plato’s theory of discourse is an abiding belief in the premise that a major function of rhetoric is to generate, create, and discover knowledge” (19). =B & A
“. . .Plato was committed to an argument centered theory of rhetoric” (21). =B
“Plato carefully demonstrates the need for a communicator to display courage in articulating his arguments and convictions” (22). =B & A
“Plato viewed widom as an ultimate goal in life” (23). =B
“He further held that the person who achieves knowledge or wisdom experiences the true meaning of what it is to be good; and it is he alone who rids himself of false opinions, becomes an expert in a chosen field, enjoys full happiness, and comes into the presence of the gods” (23).=B & A.
“Plato, as noted earlier, had a world view that gave primacy to reason as the principle motivating force to help us grasp the meaning of ideal forms” (24). =B
Is this where rhetoric began its journey into reason and away from emotion?
“Plato, despite disclaimers to the contrary in portions of ‘Gorgias,’ was fully devoted to the idea of rhetoric as action” (24). = B & A.
“Of all the emotions, the one which receives the greatest attention from Plato is love---“ (25). =B
“Plato found his rationale for supporting a form of persuasion that was moral/philosophical in nature. Persuasion, he came to believe, was necessary for the successful leadership of the state” (25.
“The single most useful and effective communication method is the dialogue form which Plato invented and called dialectic. Dialectic as described by Plato ‘is the copingstone of the sciences’—a science which is set above all other sciences” (30). =B & A & M
1.“Dialectic when practiced in a proper manner adheres to a clearly organized pattern which moves in a chronological sequence beginning with a definition of terms and ending with a vision of the ideal as seen in universals” (30). =B & M.
2.“Division and integration or unification, consisting of analysis and synthesis, is a second step in the dialectical process” (30).
3.“the interlocutor proceeds to the their step which includes refutation and cross-examination” =B
4.”Following the refutation and cross-examination, a fourth and final step is instituted consisting of a modification of the original position” (31). =B
“Even more remarkable, I feel, is Plato’s relevance for contemporary students of rhetoric. His conviction that human discourse is central to man’s existence; that rhetoric at its highest seeks to create knowledge, promote values, and produce action; and that dialectic, with its reliance on argument, represents the ideal rhetorical method place him squarely in the tradition of modern thought” (35). = B & A.
“Plato’s strong preference for an ethics-centered theory of discourse gave to his ideas a permanent relevance” (36). =B
“the rhetorical teachings of Plato, while emphasizing the various forms of communication, highlight inan impressive way the potential influence of dialectic as an innovative and powerful instructional device” =B
“Plato, first of all, was a highly significant thinker who recognized the centrality of discourse in its myriad forms, not only in the doing of philosophy but in the conducting of human affairs” (17). =B
“When examining Plato’s commitment to the value of discourse, it is incumbent on us to appreciate the broad scope which his theory of rhetoric entails. Rhetoric, he held, embraces any form of discourse designed to win the soul” (18). =B & A.
“It is evident, therefore, that Plato, like Kenneth Burke and Chaim Perelman in the modern era, saw the need to place the interpersonal communication pattern within the sphere of rhetoric” (18). =B
“Further proof of Plato’s willingness to regard public communication, despite its partiality for an uninterrupted flow of discourse, as a legitimate and vital part of rhetoric, is his occasional practice of constructing orations as integral parts of his dialogues” (18). =B
“A second important aaspect of Plato’s theory of discourse is an abiding belief in the premise that a major function of rhetoric is to generate, create, and discover knowledge” (19). =B & A
“. . .Plato was committed to an argument centered theory of rhetoric” (21). =B
“Plato carefully demonstrates the need for a communicator to display courage in articulating his arguments and convictions” (22). =B & A
“Plato viewed widom as an ultimate goal in life” (23). =B
“He further held that the person who achieves knowledge or wisdom experiences the true meaning of what it is to be good; and it is he alone who rids himself of false opinions, becomes an expert in a chosen field, enjoys full happiness, and comes into the presence of the gods” (23).=B & A.
“Plato, as noted earlier, had a world view that gave primacy to reason as the principle motivating force to help us grasp the meaning of ideal forms” (24). =B
Is this where rhetoric began its journey into reason and away from emotion?
“Plato, despite disclaimers to the contrary in portions of ‘Gorgias,’ was fully devoted to the idea of rhetoric as action” (24). = B & A.
“Of all the emotions, the one which receives the greatest attention from Plato is love---“ (25). =B
“Plato found his rationale for supporting a form of persuasion that was moral/philosophical in nature. Persuasion, he came to believe, was necessary for the successful leadership of the state” (25.
“The single most useful and effective communication method is the dialogue form which Plato invented and called dialectic. Dialectic as described by Plato ‘is the copingstone of the sciences’—a science which is set above all other sciences” (30). =B & A & M
1.“Dialectic when practiced in a proper manner adheres to a clearly organized pattern which moves in a chronological sequence beginning with a definition of terms and ending with a vision of the ideal as seen in universals” (30). =B & M.
2.“Division and integration or unification, consisting of analysis and synthesis, is a second step in the dialectical process” (30).
3.“the interlocutor proceeds to the their step which includes refutation and cross-examination” =B
4.”Following the refutation and cross-examination, a fourth and final step is instituted consisting of a modification of the original position” (31). =B
“Even more remarkable, I feel, is Plato’s relevance for contemporary students of rhetoric. His conviction that human discourse is central to man’s existence; that rhetoric at its highest seeks to create knowledge, promote values, and produce action; and that dialectic, with its reliance on argument, represents the ideal rhetorical method place him squarely in the tradition of modern thought” (35). = B & A.
“Plato’s strong preference for an ethics-centered theory of discourse gave to his ideas a permanent relevance” (36). =B
“the rhetorical teachings of Plato, while emphasizing the various forms of communication, highlight inan impressive way the potential influence of dialectic as an innovative and powerful instructional device” =B
Connors, Robert J. Essays on Classical Rhetoric
Connors, Robert J., “The Revival of Rhetoric in America” Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse. Southern Illinois UP: Carbondale. 1984.
“The earliest rhetorical instruction and theory in America were not classical in nature; they were informed not by Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian, but by Peter Ramus and Omer Talon” =B
“the first ‘revival’ of classical rhetoric actually took place in eithteenth-century America and can perhaps be best associated with John Ward’s A System of Oratory (Longdon, 1759), which Warren Guthrie views as the most pervasive synthesis of Greek and Roman theory then available” (1). =B
“Ironic as it may seem, the growing emphasis on writing in colleges, particularly the shift from oral to written evaluation of students, also played an important role” (4). =B
Scholars of oral rhetoric chose not to be ignored by English departments anymore and struck out on their own to form the National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking. (6).
PARAPHRASE.
“Not until the late 1930’s and the early 1940’s did the first signs of a second revival of rhetoric begin to emerge” (8). =B
“The rediscovery of classical rhetoric in its application to writing pedagogy began in 1962, when P. Albert Duhamel and his collegue Richard E. Hughes published Rhetoric: Principles and Usage” (10).
“The impact of this rhetorical revival on composition studies was confirmed by the 1963 CCCC” (10). =B
“The twentieth-century revival of rhetoric entails a recovery of the classical tradition, with its marriage of a rich and fully articulated theory with an equally efficacious practice” (15).
“The earliest rhetorical instruction and theory in America were not classical in nature; they were informed not by Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian, but by Peter Ramus and Omer Talon” =B
“the first ‘revival’ of classical rhetoric actually took place in eithteenth-century America and can perhaps be best associated with John Ward’s A System of Oratory (Longdon, 1759), which Warren Guthrie views as the most pervasive synthesis of Greek and Roman theory then available” (1). =B
“Ironic as it may seem, the growing emphasis on writing in colleges, particularly the shift from oral to written evaluation of students, also played an important role” (4). =B
Scholars of oral rhetoric chose not to be ignored by English departments anymore and struck out on their own to form the National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking. (6).
PARAPHRASE.
“Not until the late 1930’s and the early 1940’s did the first signs of a second revival of rhetoric begin to emerge” (8). =B
“The rediscovery of classical rhetoric in its application to writing pedagogy began in 1962, when P. Albert Duhamel and his collegue Richard E. Hughes published Rhetoric: Principles and Usage” (10).
“The impact of this rhetorical revival on composition studies was confirmed by the 1963 CCCC” (10). =B
“The twentieth-century revival of rhetoric entails a recovery of the classical tradition, with its marriage of a rich and fully articulated theory with an equally efficacious practice” (15).
Sunday, February 7, 2010
Brummett, Barry. Rhetorical Dimensions of Pop Culture
Brummett, Barry. Rhetorical Dimensions of Popular Cultures. Alabama UP: Tuscaloosa. 1991.
Media determinism may be defined as the belief that the content of a culture (its habits of thought, typical concerns, vocabulary norms and values, key symbols) is dictated by the inevitable domination of a medium of communication” (5). =E
Conduct books fell within that realm. They were using the most popular and prevalent method of the day which was books, tracts, etc.
“A media determinist finds formal or structural links between a medium and a culture” (6). =B & E.
“Medium refers to patterns of social usage of communication technology in a particular culture” (6). =B
“Walter Ong (1967), writing in the tradition of Harold Innis (1951), diplays deterministic leanings in his argument that the dominant medium in a culture will strongly influence the habits of thought in that culture (6). =B & E & A.
So, when books were the dominant medium (16, 17th centuries) that produced the most influence. Images are now the most dominant medium, aren’t they? So the images of the starving children carry a great deal of influence.
“Postman (1985, p. 130) argues that television induces its audiences to see al problems as quickly solvable throught the application of commodities grounded in modern technology” (13).
“The relatively small size of the television screen makes it in appropriate for depicting large panoramic scenes. Close-up shots of smaller objects are therefore needed to allow the medium’s primarily visual codes to work . . . An icon particularly well suited to such close-up depeiction is the human body, particularly the face. Therefore, television focuses on character over action . . ., and the actor has primacy. . .” (15).
This makes TV and print media very good for save the children type ads.
“As we have seen, the audience (in capitalist America) is urged to think in terms of commodity solutions toward life’s problems, to think inpersonal terms rather than broader public terms (which would lead one to consider such issues as class, distribution of power among groups, and exploitation of whole classes of other people)” (16). =E
“Television is also intimate in the sense that it is placed within familial contexts and is almost always viewed domestically. . . Picirillo . . .argues that this insertion of television into the daily routine intensifies televisual realism because it makes television presentations seem as normal and taken-for-granted as the domestic surroundings” (15).
Books can do this as well. They are very intimate objects.
“Television encourages narcissistic preoccupations with personal appearance, but it also fosters widespread personal empathy for starving Ethiopians thousands of mailes away”(21).
Save the Children ads.
“How the public is wooed by competing interests to render the decisions that it has made throughout history has been the province of rhetoric” (36). =B & E
“rhetoric is essentially a complex, multilevel social function that is carried out through correspondingly complex manifestations” (37). =B & E
“As a necessary function of societies, rhetoric is thus a dimension of any life lived under social influence; thus, rhetoric is that part of an act or object that influences how social meanings are created, maintained, and opposed” (38). =E
That social function, that influence, is what made the rhetoric of conduct books so pervasive in society. It became the social norm.
“At one end of the continuum, rhetoric serves an exigent function: it addresses exigencies of the moment, pressing problems, perceived quandaries, and frank questions (Bitzer 1968)” (39). =B
“The exigent is carried out by certain manifestations of rhetoric, which I will call interventionist manifestations. When rhetoric is manifested as interventionist, it has at least three characteristics: 1) People are consciously aware that a rhetorical function is being performed because it is manifested in signs that suggest explicitly suasory intent” (40). =B
“2) Because rhetors know that they are specifically attempting to influence meanings, they take (or are in a position to be expected to take) responsibility for doing so. It is clear that someone has made an intentional, planned, and strategic effort to address a problem” (40). =B
“3) interventionist messages take the form of discrete texts defined by their sources” (40). =B
“The middle of the rhetorical function continuum I am calling the quotidian, for here are managed the public and personal meanings that affect everyday, even minute-to-minute decisions” (41). =B
This is where there is no “immediate need” where the rhetoric influences actions and ways of thought that are continuous, not a one time deal. Conduct Books.
“Meanings are managed and people are influenced by a flow of signs, including table settings, a spouse’s facial expressions, styles of dress, forms of greeting and farewell, small talk, the ambiance of a restaurant, the severe architecture of a court building, elevator music, rap music coming from a neighborhood window, and the decoration of a dentist’s office” (41). =E
“To perform the quotidian function, people appropriate phrases, slogans, actions, nonverbal signs, etc., that are already available in the society or organization within which one is acting” (42). =E
So, where conduct literature is concerned, we pick up on the “speak” of where we are wanting to fit in. Young women adopted and adapted to the expectations of these works.
In contrast to interventionist manifestations, people are 1) relatively (recall that we are dealing with a continuum) less consciously aware that the management of shared meanings is under way” (42). =E
“Because people are less consciously aware that meaning is being managed, they are 20 less likely to take or assign responsibility for a rhetorical effort” (42). =E
If they are less aware that meaning is being managed then they are also less aware that they, their opinions, and their actions are being managed. This is definitely hooked to conduct literature.
“Because the construction of texts is relatively less consciously and clearly defined by a responsible source, the appropriational manifestation of rhetoric involves 3) diffuse rather than discrete texts” (43). =E
“The quotidian level is where a group’s common sense is managed. ‘Common sense’ is not a unified or simple category; it includes whatever people take for granted as well as assumptions that they come to question (43). =E
Thus, people (scholars and laity alike) develop a habit of regarding rhetoric as not a dimension of experience but as an exclusively interventionist manifestation: a whole, discrete text, a separate class of actions or events “ (50). =E
Rhetoric does not have to be a “discrete text”, but can be something much more pervasive, and something that we don’t “see” as readily as a discrete text.
“To restrict the term ‘rhetoric’ to but one manifestation of but one level of a social function is to ignore the broader placement of that level and that manifestation within a whole social system” (56). =E
So, it is not simply a manner of finding a “means to persuade”, but also figuring out who is doing the persuading. The persuasion can come from outside the text, but within the social system.
“Becker’s model suggests that this is how all of us experience communication when we are not deferring to a source’s definition of discrete texts: We move through an environment of “bits” of information, bits contained in media broadcasts, posters, comments heard or overheard, writings on cereal boxes, the physicial condition of buildings or streets, the weather, etc. And as we move through this environment, we assemble bits into messages which Becker described as ‘mosaics” (64). = B & E
The idea of the mosaic is extremely interesting when thinking of rhetoric. We assume a simple idea or way of framing an idea does all the work. This is untrue. In conduct books the bits of the mosaic were made up of not only what the ladies read, but when they lived, with whom they associated, the social “norm”, etc.
“We have seen how traditional rhetorical theory treats rhetoric as a set of discrete texts rather than as a complex function manifested in complex ways” (67). =B
“As rhetorical scholars we need to preserve a sensitivity to the full range of functions and manifestations” (67). =B & E
“So when we speak of mosaics here, we are at the same time speaking of kinds of rhetorical manifestations and the functions they perform” (72). =B
“Rhetoric which is the struggle over meaning management, is thus also a struggle over which patterns to employ in making meaning” (75). = B & E
“Let us read “bit” for “event”, and understand that by bit, I mean an event, an object, a person, in short, any experience of sensations that we perceive as a unit, a package, an entity, because we have been socially influenced to so perceieve them” (77). =B & E
Bits are parts of mosaics.
“It should be clear than some patterns will serve the interest of some groups in society while other patterns serve other interests” (80). =A & E.
‘people themselves are extensions of the field of bits, texts and cultural artifacts which is ordered into mosaics” (80). =B & E
“To see text and experience as distinct is the work of a mosaic; I am arguing that apart from that work, text and experience distinct in any absolute privileged sense” (85). =B
A mosaic takes separate pieces to create a whole which runs together indistinguishably from the bits.
“I have defended here a vision of the human being as a social and ordering creature. In ordering experience, the form that guides the ordering also situates and creates the subject. The subject is thus continuous with the world that is being ordered, and the subject is an agent for expanding the mosaic, the order or meaning achieved backward and forward in time because the subject supplies the context for the creation of the mosaic text" (104).
The “bits” flow through the timeline as do the people who are the subject.But what does time do to either?
“This theory is keyed to the term homology, the formal linkage underlying structuring and unifying a mosaic” (111). =B
Media determinism may be defined as the belief that the content of a culture (its habits of thought, typical concerns, vocabulary norms and values, key symbols) is dictated by the inevitable domination of a medium of communication” (5). =E
Conduct books fell within that realm. They were using the most popular and prevalent method of the day which was books, tracts, etc.
“A media determinist finds formal or structural links between a medium and a culture” (6). =B & E.
“Medium refers to patterns of social usage of communication technology in a particular culture” (6). =B
“Walter Ong (1967), writing in the tradition of Harold Innis (1951), diplays deterministic leanings in his argument that the dominant medium in a culture will strongly influence the habits of thought in that culture (6). =B & E & A.
So, when books were the dominant medium (16, 17th centuries) that produced the most influence. Images are now the most dominant medium, aren’t they? So the images of the starving children carry a great deal of influence.
“Postman (1985, p. 130) argues that television induces its audiences to see al problems as quickly solvable throught the application of commodities grounded in modern technology” (13).
“The relatively small size of the television screen makes it in appropriate for depicting large panoramic scenes. Close-up shots of smaller objects are therefore needed to allow the medium’s primarily visual codes to work . . . An icon particularly well suited to such close-up depeiction is the human body, particularly the face. Therefore, television focuses on character over action . . ., and the actor has primacy. . .” (15).
This makes TV and print media very good for save the children type ads.
“As we have seen, the audience (in capitalist America) is urged to think in terms of commodity solutions toward life’s problems, to think inpersonal terms rather than broader public terms (which would lead one to consider such issues as class, distribution of power among groups, and exploitation of whole classes of other people)” (16). =E
“Television is also intimate in the sense that it is placed within familial contexts and is almost always viewed domestically. . . Picirillo . . .argues that this insertion of television into the daily routine intensifies televisual realism because it makes television presentations seem as normal and taken-for-granted as the domestic surroundings” (15).
Books can do this as well. They are very intimate objects.
“Television encourages narcissistic preoccupations with personal appearance, but it also fosters widespread personal empathy for starving Ethiopians thousands of mailes away”(21).
Save the Children ads.
“How the public is wooed by competing interests to render the decisions that it has made throughout history has been the province of rhetoric” (36). =B & E
“rhetoric is essentially a complex, multilevel social function that is carried out through correspondingly complex manifestations” (37). =B & E
“As a necessary function of societies, rhetoric is thus a dimension of any life lived under social influence; thus, rhetoric is that part of an act or object that influences how social meanings are created, maintained, and opposed” (38). =E
That social function, that influence, is what made the rhetoric of conduct books so pervasive in society. It became the social norm.
“At one end of the continuum, rhetoric serves an exigent function: it addresses exigencies of the moment, pressing problems, perceived quandaries, and frank questions (Bitzer 1968)” (39). =B
“The exigent is carried out by certain manifestations of rhetoric, which I will call interventionist manifestations. When rhetoric is manifested as interventionist, it has at least three characteristics: 1) People are consciously aware that a rhetorical function is being performed because it is manifested in signs that suggest explicitly suasory intent” (40). =B
“2) Because rhetors know that they are specifically attempting to influence meanings, they take (or are in a position to be expected to take) responsibility for doing so. It is clear that someone has made an intentional, planned, and strategic effort to address a problem” (40). =B
“3) interventionist messages take the form of discrete texts defined by their sources” (40). =B
“The middle of the rhetorical function continuum I am calling the quotidian, for here are managed the public and personal meanings that affect everyday, even minute-to-minute decisions” (41). =B
This is where there is no “immediate need” where the rhetoric influences actions and ways of thought that are continuous, not a one time deal. Conduct Books.
“Meanings are managed and people are influenced by a flow of signs, including table settings, a spouse’s facial expressions, styles of dress, forms of greeting and farewell, small talk, the ambiance of a restaurant, the severe architecture of a court building, elevator music, rap music coming from a neighborhood window, and the decoration of a dentist’s office” (41). =E
“To perform the quotidian function, people appropriate phrases, slogans, actions, nonverbal signs, etc., that are already available in the society or organization within which one is acting” (42). =E
So, where conduct literature is concerned, we pick up on the “speak” of where we are wanting to fit in. Young women adopted and adapted to the expectations of these works.
In contrast to interventionist manifestations, people are 1) relatively (recall that we are dealing with a continuum) less consciously aware that the management of shared meanings is under way” (42). =E
“Because people are less consciously aware that meaning is being managed, they are 20 less likely to take or assign responsibility for a rhetorical effort” (42). =E
If they are less aware that meaning is being managed then they are also less aware that they, their opinions, and their actions are being managed. This is definitely hooked to conduct literature.
“Because the construction of texts is relatively less consciously and clearly defined by a responsible source, the appropriational manifestation of rhetoric involves 3) diffuse rather than discrete texts” (43). =E
“The quotidian level is where a group’s common sense is managed. ‘Common sense’ is not a unified or simple category; it includes whatever people take for granted as well as assumptions that they come to question (43). =E
Thus, people (scholars and laity alike) develop a habit of regarding rhetoric as not a dimension of experience but as an exclusively interventionist manifestation: a whole, discrete text, a separate class of actions or events “ (50). =E
Rhetoric does not have to be a “discrete text”, but can be something much more pervasive, and something that we don’t “see” as readily as a discrete text.
“To restrict the term ‘rhetoric’ to but one manifestation of but one level of a social function is to ignore the broader placement of that level and that manifestation within a whole social system” (56). =E
So, it is not simply a manner of finding a “means to persuade”, but also figuring out who is doing the persuading. The persuasion can come from outside the text, but within the social system.
“Becker’s model suggests that this is how all of us experience communication when we are not deferring to a source’s definition of discrete texts: We move through an environment of “bits” of information, bits contained in media broadcasts, posters, comments heard or overheard, writings on cereal boxes, the physicial condition of buildings or streets, the weather, etc. And as we move through this environment, we assemble bits into messages which Becker described as ‘mosaics” (64). = B & E
The idea of the mosaic is extremely interesting when thinking of rhetoric. We assume a simple idea or way of framing an idea does all the work. This is untrue. In conduct books the bits of the mosaic were made up of not only what the ladies read, but when they lived, with whom they associated, the social “norm”, etc.
“We have seen how traditional rhetorical theory treats rhetoric as a set of discrete texts rather than as a complex function manifested in complex ways” (67). =B
“As rhetorical scholars we need to preserve a sensitivity to the full range of functions and manifestations” (67). =B & E
“So when we speak of mosaics here, we are at the same time speaking of kinds of rhetorical manifestations and the functions they perform” (72). =B
“Rhetoric which is the struggle over meaning management, is thus also a struggle over which patterns to employ in making meaning” (75). = B & E
“Let us read “bit” for “event”, and understand that by bit, I mean an event, an object, a person, in short, any experience of sensations that we perceive as a unit, a package, an entity, because we have been socially influenced to so perceieve them” (77). =B & E
Bits are parts of mosaics.
“It should be clear than some patterns will serve the interest of some groups in society while other patterns serve other interests” (80). =A & E.
‘people themselves are extensions of the field of bits, texts and cultural artifacts which is ordered into mosaics” (80). =B & E
“To see text and experience as distinct is the work of a mosaic; I am arguing that apart from that work, text and experience distinct in any absolute privileged sense” (85). =B
A mosaic takes separate pieces to create a whole which runs together indistinguishably from the bits.
“I have defended here a vision of the human being as a social and ordering creature. In ordering experience, the form that guides the ordering also situates and creates the subject. The subject is thus continuous with the world that is being ordered, and the subject is an agent for expanding the mosaic, the order or meaning achieved backward and forward in time because the subject supplies the context for the creation of the mosaic text" (104).
The “bits” flow through the timeline as do the people who are the subject.But what does time do to either?
“This theory is keyed to the term homology, the formal linkage underlying structuring and unifying a mosaic” (111). =B
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Gatchet, Roger. A Hystery of Colonial Witchcraft Uncovering Hidden
Gatchet, Roger “A Hytery of Colonial Witchcraft: Witch-Hunt Tourism and Commenoration in Salem, Massachussetts. Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“The ‘witch’ label, so often used as a discursive marker to identify the so-called “monsters” of society, functions as “an approved mechanism for the disguiser, and discharge of social violence’ . . .Calling someone a monster, a witch, or any label that denotes monstrosity or “Otherness” does far more than place that person in an undesirable category—it often leads to serious real-life effects like persecution, alienation, and violence” (179). =E
So labeling women chaste or unchaste, wanton, etc. gave society an opportunity to take certain females out of the social realm.
“A dominant narrative is a privileged story, account , or way of understanding that is produced by an authority” (179). =E
So, men had the dominant narrative over social issues in conduct books, white non-profit organizations have the dominanant narrative over third world countries, etc.
“The narratives that Salem tourists encounter disguise the relationships between patriarchy and gender, and capitalism and violence, relationships essential for understanding why the hunt happened” (192). =B
“They are framed by a narrative, or narratives, that do rhetorical work leading to real life consequences (194). =E
“The ‘witch’ label, so often used as a discursive marker to identify the so-called “monsters” of society, functions as “an approved mechanism for the disguiser, and discharge of social violence’ . . .Calling someone a monster, a witch, or any label that denotes monstrosity or “Otherness” does far more than place that person in an undesirable category—it often leads to serious real-life effects like persecution, alienation, and violence” (179). =E
So labeling women chaste or unchaste, wanton, etc. gave society an opportunity to take certain females out of the social realm.
“A dominant narrative is a privileged story, account , or way of understanding that is produced by an authority” (179). =E
So, men had the dominant narrative over social issues in conduct books, white non-profit organizations have the dominanant narrative over third world countries, etc.
“The narratives that Salem tourists encounter disguise the relationships between patriarchy and gender, and capitalism and violence, relationships essential for understanding why the hunt happened” (192). =B
“They are framed by a narrative, or narratives, that do rhetorical work leading to real life consequences (194). =E
Aguayo, Angela J. The Revisioned American Dream Uncovering Hidden
Aguayo, Angela J. “The Re-visioned American Dream: The Wildlife Documentary Form as
Conservative Nostalgia” Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“Form or pattern embodied in many different texts, is a powerful mediator between the message and audience” (144). =A
“the audience consumes images as though the action is happening right before their eyes. In that moment, the camera’s eye becomes the human eye, and the images function as sensory evidence” (145). =E
Does it work the same way with still images?
Objectivity could be considered the problematic term of our time. Objectivity demands that impartiality be embedded into our social fabric” (152). =E
This is important.
Conservative Nostalgia” Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“Form or pattern embodied in many different texts, is a powerful mediator between the message and audience” (144). =A
“the audience consumes images as though the action is happening right before their eyes. In that moment, the camera’s eye becomes the human eye, and the images function as sensory evidence” (145). =E
Does it work the same way with still images?
Objectivity could be considered the problematic term of our time. Objectivity demands that impartiality be embedded into our social fabric” (152). =E
This is important.
Winslo, Luke. Classy Morality Uncovering Hidden
Winslow, Luke. “Classy Morality: The Rhetoric of Joel Osteen” Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“Power is often obtained and reinforced through the evaluations and judgments we make about the people around us” (123).
Perception is the key to power. It’s how people perceive each other, a situation, etc. It’s how we identify with the people to whom we are attempting to relate. How does this relate to Burke’s theory of identity? Does it?
“Class is another criterion we often use to make judgments about other people” (123). =A & E
“But another benefit that is rarely openly acknowledged is the assignment of higher moral status to the upper class. In the same way that we connect good looks with intelligence, we make moral judgments based on class standing. This allows class standing to represent much more than wealth” (124).
Very prominent within conduct books. The elite wrote them, using their class standing as backing for their own morality and the lower classes purchased or read them in order to imitate the upper classes. This gave a feeling of not only raising one’s class standing, but gave one the feeling of taking on the “morally correct” way of approaching the social.
“as a society we would prefer to avoid the class issue. bell hooks, in her book Where We Stand, argues that, nowadays we would rather talk about race and gender than class” (125). =E
Is that because we find race and gender more pertinent or is it because as scholars people tend to feel that they have elevated their “class” standing, and do not want to disrupt that?
“The best way to understand form is to think about it as a consistent structure or pattern found in the language of text (Burke, Counter-Statement 31) (127). =E & M
This whole idea of class as morality is great. I find that I think it will help reinforce my argument.
“Power is often obtained and reinforced through the evaluations and judgments we make about the people around us” (123).
Perception is the key to power. It’s how people perceive each other, a situation, etc. It’s how we identify with the people to whom we are attempting to relate. How does this relate to Burke’s theory of identity? Does it?
“Class is another criterion we often use to make judgments about other people” (123). =A & E
“But another benefit that is rarely openly acknowledged is the assignment of higher moral status to the upper class. In the same way that we connect good looks with intelligence, we make moral judgments based on class standing. This allows class standing to represent much more than wealth” (124).
Very prominent within conduct books. The elite wrote them, using their class standing as backing for their own morality and the lower classes purchased or read them in order to imitate the upper classes. This gave a feeling of not only raising one’s class standing, but gave one the feeling of taking on the “morally correct” way of approaching the social.
“as a society we would prefer to avoid the class issue. bell hooks, in her book Where We Stand, argues that, nowadays we would rather talk about race and gender than class” (125). =E
Is that because we find race and gender more pertinent or is it because as scholars people tend to feel that they have elevated their “class” standing, and do not want to disrupt that?
“The best way to understand form is to think about it as a consistent structure or pattern found in the language of text (Burke, Counter-Statement 31) (127). =E & M
This whole idea of class as morality is great. I find that I think it will help reinforce my argument.
Tuesday, February 2, 2010
Olson, Kathryn M. “Detecting a Common Uncovering Hidden
Olson, Kathryn M. “Detecting a Common Interpretive Framework for Impersonal Violence:
The Homology in Participants’ Rhetoric on Sport Hunting, “Hate Crimes” and Stranger Rape” Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“According to dictionary definitions, a “homology” is the quality or condition of exhibiting correspondence or similarity in position, value, function, or structure; for example, a seal’s flippers are homologous to a human’s arms. . .A rhetorical homology is a formal parrell that cuts across seemingly dissimilar discourses” (87). =B
“I present the rhetorical homology explicityly as a recurring socially held and strategically applied symbolic pattern within contemporary American culture, rather than one emerging from nature or from human’s psycholocial structures” (88).
“Symbolically grounded violence can be resisted with more persuasive counter-symbol use” (115). =E
So then, guilt rhetoric based on Eve’s original sin, could symbolically be countered with rhetoric based upon other Bible information that appears to counter this.
The Homology in Participants’ Rhetoric on Sport Hunting, “Hate Crimes” and Stranger Rape” Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“According to dictionary definitions, a “homology” is the quality or condition of exhibiting correspondence or similarity in position, value, function, or structure; for example, a seal’s flippers are homologous to a human’s arms. . .A rhetorical homology is a formal parrell that cuts across seemingly dissimilar discourses” (87). =B
“I present the rhetorical homology explicityly as a recurring socially held and strategically applied symbolic pattern within contemporary American culture, rather than one emerging from nature or from human’s psycholocial structures” (88).
“Symbolically grounded violence can be resisted with more persuasive counter-symbol use” (115). =E
So then, guilt rhetoric based on Eve’s original sin, could symbolically be countered with rhetoric based upon other Bible information that appears to counter this.
Perks, Lisa Glebatis. “The Evil Albino Uncovering Hidden
Perks, Lisa Glebatis. “The Evil Albino: Cinematic Othering and Scapegoating of Extreme Whites.” Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“Obviously, the trend of evil signification may cultivate discrimination toward albinos, but the consistent correlation of skin color with morality may have more severe consequences for collective society” (72).=E
So, if we look at the fact that we have “evilized” blacks throughout history and add to that the consistent barrage of advertisements about wretchedly poor and uncared for children put on by the not-for profit orgs which raise money that way, then we have a multi-faceted social problem. Not only do we see these black children as desperately needing help, we see them as abandonded by careless parents, living in a country which produces people who are uncaring, and in a place where people cannot figure out the simplest manner of carring for self and for family.
“Barry Brummett’s method of homological criticism is a fruitful tool. This critical method looks past surface features to uncover underlying formal persuasive appeals among disparate texts and experiences” (73).
“Obviously, the trend of evil signification may cultivate discrimination toward albinos, but the consistent correlation of skin color with morality may have more severe consequences for collective society” (72).=E
So, if we look at the fact that we have “evilized” blacks throughout history and add to that the consistent barrage of advertisements about wretchedly poor and uncared for children put on by the not-for profit orgs which raise money that way, then we have a multi-faceted social problem. Not only do we see these black children as desperately needing help, we see them as abandonded by careless parents, living in a country which produces people who are uncaring, and in a place where people cannot figure out the simplest manner of carring for self and for family.
“Barry Brummett’s method of homological criticism is a fruitful tool. This critical method looks past surface features to uncover underlying formal persuasive appeals among disparate texts and experiences” (73).
Brummett, Barry Whispers of a Racial Past Uncovering
Brummett, Barry. “Whispers of a Racial Past: Forms of White Liberal History in The Horse Whisperer. Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“The Myth depends upon constructing people of color in certain ways. The Myth constructs an image of Otherness in people of color, based upon certain recurring attributed dimensions of those people. As The Myth is reindiviualated in particular texts, stock characters must be created to embody those stereotypical dimensions” =B
If The Myth is constructing people in certain ways, then perhaps it constructs identities so as to encourage the “othered” to identify with it. Burke’s theory of identity does state that we identify with others and this draws us into being convinced. Also, if the myth is identifying one sector of society in a particular way, then it follows that identity is one which is propogated by another sector thereby creating the identification with the myth in the ways that Burke proposes.
“One recurring dimension of Thy Myth is the emasculation of people of color. Strong males and, more important, male principles of control, law, and dominance are understood by The Myth to be recessive if not downright absent” (52). =E
“The Myth’s assertion of a lack of connection and communication among people of diverse backgrounds, and suggests that the snippy social manner of the matriarchal Others may be largely to blame for the disjunction” (59). =E
This statement is so reminiscent of the way conduct books are posed. The male writer often trying to come off as “mothering” the young women toward a behavior in order to “better” them and make them understand the “world”. It created and maintained that social disjunction placing young women on the outside and in positions of extreme distress.
“This study thus illustrates the importance of thinking about rhetorical homologies as highly adaptive engines for ordering social consciousness in the service of powier” (69).= E
“The Myth depends upon constructing people of color in certain ways. The Myth constructs an image of Otherness in people of color, based upon certain recurring attributed dimensions of those people. As The Myth is reindiviualated in particular texts, stock characters must be created to embody those stereotypical dimensions” =B
If The Myth is constructing people in certain ways, then perhaps it constructs identities so as to encourage the “othered” to identify with it. Burke’s theory of identity does state that we identify with others and this draws us into being convinced. Also, if the myth is identifying one sector of society in a particular way, then it follows that identity is one which is propogated by another sector thereby creating the identification with the myth in the ways that Burke proposes.
“One recurring dimension of Thy Myth is the emasculation of people of color. Strong males and, more important, male principles of control, law, and dominance are understood by The Myth to be recessive if not downright absent” (52). =E
“The Myth’s assertion of a lack of connection and communication among people of diverse backgrounds, and suggests that the snippy social manner of the matriarchal Others may be largely to blame for the disjunction” (59). =E
This statement is so reminiscent of the way conduct books are posed. The male writer often trying to come off as “mothering” the young women toward a behavior in order to “better” them and make them understand the “world”. It created and maintained that social disjunction placing young women on the outside and in positions of extreme distress.
“This study thus illustrates the importance of thinking about rhetorical homologies as highly adaptive engines for ordering social consciousness in the service of powier” (69).= E
Perks, Winslow and Avital Limited Representation Hidden Rhetorics
Perks, Lisa Glebatis, Winslow, Luke, Avital, Sharon. “Limited Representation: A Homology of Discriminatory Media Portrayals of Little People and African Americans” Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
"Discursive structures, which may be thought of as underlying patterns of language that influence word choice, order, and meaning, inevitably develop out of our use of language to communicate with one another. While these language patterns offer us a shared means of communication, they also organize relationships between people that may empower some groups and disempower others” (32). =B
This covers the nuances which are hard to pinpoint when talking about subtle rhetorics, especially guilt rhetorics. It is perfect for my research, and no I don’t see connections here, yet, but I bet I will.
“Being able to identify discursive patterns like these can assist you in discerning mechanisms of marginalization hidden in unexpected places” (32). =M
“The method of homological rhetorical criticism involves uncovering formal patterns among disparate texts or experiences. Because everyone is socialized in a particular society, stable categories are created in our consciousness that help us process and organize information” (33).=M
This information is one way in which I’ll be able to discover the subtle influences I see in guilt rhetoric that I have as yet been unable to explain. I really believe it will be very helpful to my work. I’m ‘cited!
“Clearly, universal similarity only strengthens the positioning of already dominant groups as the norm, the center from which everyone else deviates . . .Such portrayals make already marginalized groups feel not just different but inferior,” (43). =A
“discursive mechanisms of Othering may work to marginalize various groups of people, not just on the basis of race but on body shape, gender, or other attributes” (44). =E
"Discursive structures, which may be thought of as underlying patterns of language that influence word choice, order, and meaning, inevitably develop out of our use of language to communicate with one another. While these language patterns offer us a shared means of communication, they also organize relationships between people that may empower some groups and disempower others” (32). =B
This covers the nuances which are hard to pinpoint when talking about subtle rhetorics, especially guilt rhetorics. It is perfect for my research, and no I don’t see connections here, yet, but I bet I will.
“Being able to identify discursive patterns like these can assist you in discerning mechanisms of marginalization hidden in unexpected places” (32). =M
“The method of homological rhetorical criticism involves uncovering formal patterns among disparate texts or experiences. Because everyone is socialized in a particular society, stable categories are created in our consciousness that help us process and organize information” (33).=M
This information is one way in which I’ll be able to discover the subtle influences I see in guilt rhetoric that I have as yet been unable to explain. I really believe it will be very helpful to my work. I’m ‘cited!
“Clearly, universal similarity only strengthens the positioning of already dominant groups as the norm, the center from which everyone else deviates . . .Such portrayals make already marginalized groups feel not just different but inferior,” (43). =A
“discursive mechanisms of Othering may work to marginalize various groups of people, not just on the basis of race but on body shape, gender, or other attributes” (44). =E
Monday, February 1, 2010
Hoerl, Kristen Hidden Rhetorics Mississippi Burning
Hoerl, Kristen. Remembering and Forgetting Black Power in Mississippi Burning. Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise. Ed. Barry Brummett. Sage: Los Angeles. 2008.
“Barry Brummett describes a homology as a situation in which ‘two or more kinds of experiencing appear or can be shown to be structured according to the same pattern in some important particulars of their manifestiations” (15). =B
“By facing similar obstacles that black activists faced during the civil rights era, Mississippi Burning thus positions Ward and Anderson as symbolic stand-ins for black activists (22). =M
“Mississippi Burning is a homology for Black Power not necessarily due to any intentional or conscious efforts of the filmmakers but because both the film and Black Power proponents underscore the experience of African Americans and groups who have struggled to change oppressive laws, customs, and other structural barriers to political inclusion, economic equality, and social justice” =E
So, these homologies do not always (may even mostly) do not arrive through purpose. They simply happen, perhaps as a subconscious way of dealing with racial or gender issues?
“The patterns across Mississippi Burning and the Black Power movement suggest that films can give meaning to the past even if they aren’t explicitly based on historical events” (29) =E
“Barry Brummett describes a homology as a situation in which ‘two or more kinds of experiencing appear or can be shown to be structured according to the same pattern in some important particulars of their manifestiations” (15). =B
“By facing similar obstacles that black activists faced during the civil rights era, Mississippi Burning thus positions Ward and Anderson as symbolic stand-ins for black activists (22). =M
“Mississippi Burning is a homology for Black Power not necessarily due to any intentional or conscious efforts of the filmmakers but because both the film and Black Power proponents underscore the experience of African Americans and groups who have struggled to change oppressive laws, customs, and other structural barriers to political inclusion, economic equality, and social justice” =E
So, these homologies do not always (may even mostly) do not arrive through purpose. They simply happen, perhaps as a subconscious way of dealing with racial or gender issues?
“The patterns across Mississippi Burning and the Black Power movement suggest that films can give meaning to the past even if they aren’t explicitly based on historical events” (29) =E
Brummett, Barry Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics
Brummett, Barry ed. “Introduction” Uncovering Hidden Rhetorics: Social Issues in Disguise.
Sage: Los Angeles. 2008
“That is to say, a text or message may seem to be about one thing on the surface, but it is also about another thing, if we know how to unlock the text” (1). =E
He actually uses the phrase “sneaky rhetoric” in this book. It is so much like what I’m wanting to talk about it scares me, but then it’s not alike at all.
“Because it is important to know what we are doing if we engage social issues in talk, films,popular music, television, and so forth, understanding how social issues may be disguised in discourse is an important goal” (4).=E
I don’t think the arts are the only places in which we should look for such things. Television commercials, as opposed to shows, editorials, novels, etc. should also be included.
“Another way to look for metaphor is by searching for what we might call compression. Even language or images that are not surprising may, upon reflection, have many complex and even contradictory meanings packed within them, so many that some are bound to be in disguise when we use such terms and images in everyday life” (6).=M
So by using images in the “guilt” advertisements we are creating metaphors. Danphurians appear like this. Their children are hungry, dirty, and have no one to care for them. Things like this are metaphorical, and pack multiple image messages into a small space.
“Homological analysis and formal analysis really lie on a continuum; you reach homological analysis as you branch out and consider more and more different kinds of texts and experiences as ordered by the same underlying form” (10). =M
Both Burke and Aristotle refer to form frequently, however; I did not see the term pattern too often. I don’t know if I overlooked it, but it appears to be a good rhetorical strategy, as is repetition.
Sage: Los Angeles. 2008
“That is to say, a text or message may seem to be about one thing on the surface, but it is also about another thing, if we know how to unlock the text” (1). =E
He actually uses the phrase “sneaky rhetoric” in this book. It is so much like what I’m wanting to talk about it scares me, but then it’s not alike at all.
“Because it is important to know what we are doing if we engage social issues in talk, films,popular music, television, and so forth, understanding how social issues may be disguised in discourse is an important goal” (4).=E
I don’t think the arts are the only places in which we should look for such things. Television commercials, as opposed to shows, editorials, novels, etc. should also be included.
“Another way to look for metaphor is by searching for what we might call compression. Even language or images that are not surprising may, upon reflection, have many complex and even contradictory meanings packed within them, so many that some are bound to be in disguise when we use such terms and images in everyday life” (6).=M
So by using images in the “guilt” advertisements we are creating metaphors. Danphurians appear like this. Their children are hungry, dirty, and have no one to care for them. Things like this are metaphorical, and pack multiple image messages into a small space.
“Homological analysis and formal analysis really lie on a continuum; you reach homological analysis as you branch out and consider more and more different kinds of texts and experiences as ordered by the same underlying form” (10). =M
Both Burke and Aristotle refer to form frequently, however; I did not see the term pattern too often. I don’t know if I overlooked it, but it appears to be a good rhetorical strategy, as is repetition.
Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives
Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkley: California UP, 1969.
I had a lot of trouble finding things I found useful in this book. I love Burke, and I don’t know if it is just me being foggy headed, or if it is the infinite ability of Burke’s to be obscure. Any suggestions would be appreciated.
“We shall use five terms as generating principle of our investigation. They are: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); and also you must indicate what kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the pupose” (xv). =M
Aristotle did not talk of motives, per se; but he did speak of what needed to be placed in the mind of the rhetorician when he was inventing. All of these things were in there albeit mentioned in different terminology. Bitzer’s rhetorical situation is also in this one small piece. One must know how to “situate” what is being said, or what one will say. Agency could be seen as pathos or logos. This is reflective, or reflected in, a whole slew of other authors.
“For in the course of this work, we shall deal with many kinds of transformation—and it isi in the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; in fact, without such areas transformation would be impossible” (xix). =B
So, Aristotle’s speakers are attempting to transform—move—the audience into a newly formed idea about a certain structure.
“The word ‘ground,’ much used in both formal philosophy and everday speech when discussing motives, is likewise scenic, though readily encroaching upon the areas more directly covered by ‘agent’ and ‘purpose’ (12). =B
“Political commentators now generally use the word ‘situation’ as their synonym for scene, though often without any clear concept of its function as a statement about motives” (13). =M
In The Rhetorical Situation, Bitzer asks, “Why and how do they result in the creation of rhetoric?” (1). This speaks directly to motive in my view as it is apparent that the why and the how tell us what has spurred the writer/speaker into action.
“The most clear sounding of words can thus be used for the vaguest of reference quite as we speak of a “certain thing” when we have no particular thing in mind” (52). =B & M
This reminds me of Aritstotle’s “fridgidity” a term he uses to voice the opposite of clarity. Fridgidity creates ambiguity through a number of means, including inappropriate metaphors and double wording. Both Aristotle and Burke have a problem with this, but it does appear in most rhetoric, that lack of clarity.
“Our five terms are “transcendental” rather than formal (and are to this extent Kantian) in being categories which human thought necessarily explifies” (317).
“Language being essentially human, we would view human relations in terms of the linguistic instrument. Not mere ‘conciousness of abstracting,’ but consciousness of linguistic action generally, is needed if men are to temper absurd ambitions that have their source in faulty terminologies” (317). =B&M
Booth mentions something similar in Rhetoric of Rhetoric, by explaining that we must be able to recognize faulty arguments in order to genuinely communicate what is going on around us. Aristotle talks of faulty arguments which must, of course, begin with faulty terminologies in order to recognize what is wrong with an argument. Being able to view the faults within language and argument are important to rhetoricians in order to be able to, in Aristotle’s terms, “untie” another’s argument.
“The attitude of itself would be grounded in the systematic development of method. The method would involve the explicit study of language as the ‘critical moment’ at which human motives take form, since a linguistic factor at every point in human experience complicates and to some extend transcends the purely biological aspects of motivation” (318). =B
“Remember always that no modern instrument could have been invented, or could be produced, without the use of a vast linguistic complexity” (319).
I had a lot of trouble finding things I found useful in this book. I love Burke, and I don’t know if it is just me being foggy headed, or if it is the infinite ability of Burke’s to be obscure. Any suggestions would be appreciated.
“We shall use five terms as generating principle of our investigation. They are: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); and also you must indicate what kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the pupose” (xv). =M
Aristotle did not talk of motives, per se; but he did speak of what needed to be placed in the mind of the rhetorician when he was inventing. All of these things were in there albeit mentioned in different terminology. Bitzer’s rhetorical situation is also in this one small piece. One must know how to “situate” what is being said, or what one will say. Agency could be seen as pathos or logos. This is reflective, or reflected in, a whole slew of other authors.
“For in the course of this work, we shall deal with many kinds of transformation—and it isi in the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; in fact, without such areas transformation would be impossible” (xix). =B
So, Aristotle’s speakers are attempting to transform—move—the audience into a newly formed idea about a certain structure.
“The word ‘ground,’ much used in both formal philosophy and everday speech when discussing motives, is likewise scenic, though readily encroaching upon the areas more directly covered by ‘agent’ and ‘purpose’ (12). =B
“Political commentators now generally use the word ‘situation’ as their synonym for scene, though often without any clear concept of its function as a statement about motives” (13). =M
In The Rhetorical Situation, Bitzer asks, “Why and how do they result in the creation of rhetoric?” (1). This speaks directly to motive in my view as it is apparent that the why and the how tell us what has spurred the writer/speaker into action.
“The most clear sounding of words can thus be used for the vaguest of reference quite as we speak of a “certain thing” when we have no particular thing in mind” (52). =B & M
This reminds me of Aritstotle’s “fridgidity” a term he uses to voice the opposite of clarity. Fridgidity creates ambiguity through a number of means, including inappropriate metaphors and double wording. Both Aristotle and Burke have a problem with this, but it does appear in most rhetoric, that lack of clarity.
“Our five terms are “transcendental” rather than formal (and are to this extent Kantian) in being categories which human thought necessarily explifies” (317).
“Language being essentially human, we would view human relations in terms of the linguistic instrument. Not mere ‘conciousness of abstracting,’ but consciousness of linguistic action generally, is needed if men are to temper absurd ambitions that have their source in faulty terminologies” (317). =B&M
Booth mentions something similar in Rhetoric of Rhetoric, by explaining that we must be able to recognize faulty arguments in order to genuinely communicate what is going on around us. Aristotle talks of faulty arguments which must, of course, begin with faulty terminologies in order to recognize what is wrong with an argument. Being able to view the faults within language and argument are important to rhetoricians in order to be able to, in Aristotle’s terms, “untie” another’s argument.
“The attitude of itself would be grounded in the systematic development of method. The method would involve the explicit study of language as the ‘critical moment’ at which human motives take form, since a linguistic factor at every point in human experience complicates and to some extend transcends the purely biological aspects of motivation” (318). =B
“Remember always that no modern instrument could have been invented, or could be produced, without the use of a vast linguistic complexity” (319).
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