Smith, Adam

Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Kessinger: Montana. 1759.
“Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner” (3).
In this case you also see emotion mentioned, however; there is no case in which guilt is mentioned.
“Neither is it those circumstances only, which create pain or sorrow, that call forth our fellow—feeling. Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator” (4).
“The general idea of good or bad fortune, therefore, creates some concern for the person who has met with it, but the general idea of provocation excites no sympathy with the anger of the man who has received it. Nature, it seems teaches us to be more averse to enter into this passion, and, till informed of its cause, to be disposed rather to take part against it” (5).
“the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the great restraint upon the injustice of mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects society” (7).
“When we have read a book or poem so often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it by ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a companion” (8).
“To approve of another man’s opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of them” (11).
The adoption, however; of social views and values then ingrains them into the values of the individual. This then, is the preceptor of guilt.
“Philosophers have, of late years, considered chiefly the tendency of affections, and have given little attention to the relation which they stand in to the cause which excites them” (12).
“Society and conversation, therefore, are the most powerful remedies for restoring the mind to its tranquility, if, at any time, it has unfortunately lost it; as well as the best preservatives of that equal and happy temper, which is so necessary to self-satisfaction and enjoyment” (17).
Conversation soothes nerves, provides support, and reinforces feelings of self-worth. The conversations of young women in society during the time of conduct books was highly regulated.
(Unsocial Passions)
“Those passions, however, are regarded as necessary parts of the character of human nature. A person becomes contemptible who tamely sits still, and submits to insults without attempting either to repel or to revenge them” (29).
That is odd because women were expected to never allow themselves to succumb to their natures. Men could get angry, have sex, proclaim hunger, etc. without fear of reprimand.
“The obvious observation, therefore, which it naturally falls in our way to make, is, that our propensity to sympathize with sorrow must be very strong, and our inclination to sympathize with joy very weak” (39).
“In the superior stations of life the case is unhappily not always the same. In the courts of princes, in the drawing--rooms of the great, where success and preferment depend, not upon the esteem of intelligent and well—informed equals, but upon the fanciful and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and proud superiors; flattery and falsehood too often prevail over merit and abilities” (55).
However, wasn’t that the case where women are concerned in general?
“It is from our disposition to admire, and consequently to imitate, the richa dn the great that they are enabled to set, or to lead what is called the fashion” (56).
In other words, people imitate those with power, which could well be why women would consciously ply guilt from other women.