Richards, I.A. and Ogden, C.K. “The Meaning of Meaning”. Bizzell, Patricia and Herzberg, Bruce. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Ti

Richards, I.A. and Ogden, C.K. “The Meaning of Meaning”. Bizzell, Patricia and Herzberg,
Bruce. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Timesto Present. Bedford/St.
Martin’s: Boston. 2001 (1273-80).
“Symbolism is the study of the part played in human affairs y language and the symbols of all kinds, and especially of their influence on Thought” (1274).

“Language if it is to be used must be a ready instrument” (1275).
“The root of the trouble will be traced to the superstition that words are in some way parts of things or always imply things corresponding to them, historical instances of this still potent instinctive belief being given from many sources” (1276).
“We have not here in view the more familiar ways in which words may be used to deceive. In a later chapter, when the function of language as an instrument for the promotion of pruposes rather than as a means of symbolizing references is fully discussed, we shall see how the intention of the speaker may complicate the situation” (1277).
“Another vairiety of verbal ingenuity closely allied to this, is the deliberate use of symbols to misdirect the listener” (1277).
“Those who allow beyond question that there are people like themselves also interpreting signs and open to study should not find it difficult to admit that their observation of the behavior of others may provide at least a framework within which their own introspection, that special and deceptive case, may be fitted” (1278-79).
“The method which recognizes the common feature of sign interpretation has its dangers, but opens the way to a fresh treatment of many widely different topics” (1279).
Richards, I.A. and Ogden, C.K. “The Philosophy of Rhetoric”. Bizzell, Patricia and Herzberg,
Bruce. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Timesto Present. Bedford/St.
Martin’s: Boston. 2001. (1281-88).
“The old Rhetoric was an offspring of dispute; it developed as the rationale of pleadings and persuadings; it was the theory of the battle of words and has always been itself dominated by the combative impulse” (1281).
“It is no bad preparation for any attempt at exposition—above all of such debatable and contentious matters as those to which I am soon to turn—to realize how easily the combative impulse can put us in mental blinkers and made us take another man’s words in the ways in which we can down him with least trouble” (1281).
“All thinking from the lowest to the highest—whatever else itmay be—is sorting” (1283).
“Our risk is to confuse the abstractness we thus arrive at intellectually with the primordial abstractness out of which these impressions have already grown—before ever any conscious explicit reflection took place” (1285).

“The context theorem of meaning would prevent our making hundreds of baseless and disabling assumptions that we commonly make about meanings, over-simplifications that create false problems interfering with closer comparisons—and that is its main service” (1286).
Warrants and assumptions?